Pentagon Labyrinth

Retired Army Lieutenant Colonel Danny Davis talks about the official lies told about the Afghanistan War, revealing the truth, and how America can forge a new foreign policy path moving forward.

Retired Navy JAG and Syracuse Law professor Mark Nevitt talks about the laws governing the president’s authority to deploy the military within the United States.

Retired Army doctor Robert Adams talks about the consequences of the efforts to outsource the military’s health system over the past decade, despite repeated warnings from medical professionals.

The relationship between the military and the society it serves has a significant impact on policy decisions and even budgets. The veneration of service members in the United States today manifests benignly in the refrain, “Thank you for your service,” and the much appreciated discounts at the local home improvement center, but this reverence can also have less benign effects. The number of retired flag officers serving in high government positions, sitting on the boards of defense contractors, and appearing as talking heads on television shapes policy, which in turn drives Pentagon budgets. Dr. Steele Brand, a professor of history at The King’s College in New York City, explored the differences between the citizen-soldier and the soldier-citizen in his recent book, “Killing for the Republic.”Republican Rome produced highly adaptive armies with farmers who would moonlight as effective soldiers during the campaigning season and then return to their families and plows—a practice that helped to remove the barriers between the military and the society it served, according to Brand. He says Rome’s part-time soldiers faced an uphill battle against enemy professionals, but that their ability to adapt meant they usually prevailed in the end. In this interview, Dr. Brand explains the differences between the Roman and American models of training soldiers and how those differences contribute to the civilian-military divide.

Corruption is often viewed as a byproduct of unrest and ineffective government. Former adviser to the chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff Sarah Chayes, in her book Thieves of State: Why Corruption Threatens Global Security, makes the case that corruption is the single largest source of unrest in the world. With this lens, it is possible to better understand many of the hotspots around the world—including Afghanistan, the counties upended by the Arab Spring, and even colonial America’s revolution. Show Notes: Thieves of State Sarah Chayes: on living in Afghanistan and sleeping with a Kalashnikov The Afghan Bag Man Sarah Chayes: Global Kleptocracy *Music: “Without Limits” Ross Bugden*

Combat troops tend to get the majority of the attention in the coverage of our overseas wars. But there is an often-overlooked cadre of troops that perform a key role in our overseas campaigns and can affect both the duration and outcome of a conflict. The United States has a long history with military advisors. Soldiers in the Continental Army were on the receiving end when the Marquis de Lafayette and Baron von Steuben worked with them to increase their effectiveness on the battlefield. American forces have been advising foreign militaries since the early twentieth century in places such as the Philippines, the Caribbean, Korea, Vietnam, and more recently in Iraq and still in Afghanistan. In spite of the frequency of these missions, the services have only recently taken steps to create permanent advisor institutions. Marine Corps Captain Maurice “Chipp” Naylon spent seven months in Afghanistan as an advisor with the Georgian Army and wrote a book, The New Ministry of Truth, about his deployment. His experiences, both good and bad, provide insight to the role military advisors play. Show Notes: The New Ministry of Truth By living on Afghan base, Army advisors aim to better enable partners MCSCG Deploys to the Republic of Georgia Marines’ alliance with Georgians holds clues to future missions *Music: “Without Limits” Ross Bugden*

Military leaders are faced with a dilemma unique among the professions. While doctors get to practice medicine, architects get to design buildings, and educators get to teach students on a daily basis, military professionals spend the vast majority of their careers preparing to do a job they rarely, and in some fortunate cases, never have to actually perform. This makes the education and training of military leaders that much more important. They need to be ready to perform at their peak from the first moment they are called to do so. Those they lead will pay the price for a lack of preparation. The services already do a lot to train their people to do their jobs. Almost everyone who has been in the military can, and often does, tell stories of their time spent in the field engaged in training exercises. Not to take anything away from these exercises, but most of them are only useful insofar as they train and refine procedures—they don’t actually test people’s ability to make difficult decisions based on imperfect information. Bruce Gudmundsson and Don Vandergriff, two leading military historians, talk about how using tactical decision games helps leaders develop the skills they need to deal with uncertain situations and prevail in combat.

Military scholars and practitioners continue to debate the significance and merit of John Boyd’s ideas more than 20 years after his death. Colonel Boyd is the legendary Air Force fighter pilot who, in addition to revolutionizing aerial combat tactics and aircraft design, also changed the way Americans think about conflict and warfare. He profoundly influenced the Marine Corps’ maneuver warfare doctrine and helped shape the ground campaign that led to the rapid defeat of the Iraqi Army during the 1991 Gulf War. In recent years, some have attempted to classify Boyd’s ideas as airpower theory, which at its core is the basic idea that an air force, when commanded by airmen bombing targets selected by airmen, can influence the outcome of a conflict at the strategic level, independent of ground or naval forces. Chuck Spinney, one of Boyd’s closest collaborators, explains how Boyd pointedly disagreed with airpower theory and how his ideas encompass conflict in all forms. Show Notes: John Boyd and John Warden: Air Power’s Quest for Strategic Paralysis – David Fadok Airpower for Strategic Effect – Colin Gray “Destruction and Creation” – John Boyd “Genghis John” – Franklin C. Spinney *Music: “Without Limits” Ross Bugden*

The Navy’s version of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, recently declared ready for combat, has netted unacceptably low “fully mission capable” rates—meaning it’s in fact almost never fully ready for combat—according to a document obtained by the Center for Defense Information at the Project On Government Oversight (POGO). The fact that the Navy is pushing ahead with the aircraft in spite of evidence that it is not ready for combat and could therefore put at risk missions, as well as the troops who depend on it to get to the fight, comes at the same time as the Pentagon’s latest annual operational testing report for fiscal year 2018 shows that the entire F-35 program, the most expensive weapon system in history, is not ready to face current or future threats. We look at these issues and more in the latest episode of the Pentagon Labyrinth. Show Notes: F-35 Far from Ready to Face Current or Future Threats, Testing Data Shows FY 2018 DOT&E Annual F-35 Report NAVAIR F-35 Readiness Charts *Music: “Without Limits” Ross Bugden*

Former Army Chief of Staff Martin Dempsey issued a challenge to the Army in 2012 to change its institutional culture. In his transformative “Mission Command White Paper,” he wrote that “education and training are keys to achieving the habit of mission command; our doctrine must describe it, our schools must teach it, and we must train individually and collectively to it.” But what is mission command? Its origins are found in the Prussian military reforms during the first decade of the nineteenth century following the humiliating defeat at the hands of Napoleon at the Battle of Jena-Auerstedt in 1806. Reformers within the Prussian Army understood that victory hinged on a flexible organization composed of units led by officers empowered to use their own judgement to act based on their appraisal of the situation at hand rather than rigidly adhering to a pre-set plan when their orders no longer fit reality. Instead, officers were expected to understand the overall intent of their commander and use the resources at hand to achieve the “why” of the mission even if it didn’t follow the “how” of the issued orders. Bruce Gudmundsson and Don Vandergriff, two leading military historians, discuss the origins, implications, and challenges of mission command in today’s military.

Instructors at The Basic School, the Marine Corps’ six-month-long course for all newly commissioned officers, are using training methods used in institutions like Harvard Business School and Columbia University to make better decision-makers. The Case Method Project at Quantico, Virginia, uses decision-forcing exercises, or scenarios used to place students in the role of a person facing a difficult problem.

Navy LT Wes Van Dorn raised concerns for years about the safety of the MH-53E helicopters in his squadron. Aging equipment and shoddy maintenance plagued the entire fleet for years which he believed seriously jeopardized the lives of his crew. Tragically, he was proven correct when faulty wiring sparked a fire in his helicopter, causing it to crash off the coast of Virginia on January 8, 2014. LT Van Dorn, LT Sean Snyder, and Petty Officer Brian Collins all died from their injuries. This incident is a tragic case-study that places into clear relief many of the issues we have been raising for decades. The 53-series of helicopters have been described by some as the deadliest aircraft in the United States inventory. Many of them have been pressed far beyond their anticipated service life because three programs intended to replace the MH-53’s mine countermeasure missions failed. Maintenance troubles have also plagued the program in part because the services often prefer to spend funds on the latest over-budget piece of gadgetry rather than adequately providing for the upkeep of what is in service today. (Music: “Without Limits” Ross Bugden; Photo: Nicole Van Dorn / Investigative Studios, used with permission)

Officials in the F-35 Joint Program Office are doing paper reclassifications of potentially life-threatening design flaws to make them appear less serious, likely in an attempt to prevent the $1.5 trillion program from missing another schedule deadline and budget cap. The Center for Defense Information at the Project On Government Oversight (POGO) obtained a document showing how F-35 officials are recategorizing—rather than fixing—major design flaws to be able to claim they have completed the program’s development phase without having to pay overruns for badly needed fixes. Several of these flaws, like the lack of any means for a pilot to confirm a weapon’s target data before firing, and damage to the plane caused by the tailhook on the Air Force’s variant, have potentially serious implications for safety and combat effectiveness.

After receiving his grades from the Army’s Command and General Staff College, Major Jamie Schwandt decided to assign his own grades for the instructors and the institution itself. He did not paint a flattering portrait of the school. He took issue with the school’s leadership, the course content, and even the method of taking attendance. When he published his assessment, the blog provoked a vigorous online debate. Many people agreed with his views, but at least as many came to the defense of the school and the Army’s education system.

Jeff Groom, a former Marine Corps helicopter pilot, recently published a highly satirical, and occasionally irreverent, account of his experiences in uniform, American Cobra Pilot: A Marine Remembers a Dog and Pony Show. He talks with POGO’s Jack Shanahan Military Fellow Dan Grazier about his transition from being a highly motivated and idealistic young officer to one who critically appraised the state of the current force. He also discusses life as a pilot who flies far fewer hours than he should to truly develop his skills and perform the combat function of his military occupational specialty. By his calculations, he figures the American people paid him $50,000 each time he actually performed his real job. The problem is, he did this only twice a year.

The F-35 has now entered an unprecedented seventeenth year of continuing redesign, test deficiencies, fixes, schedule slippages, and cost overruns. And it’s still not at the finish line. Numerous missteps along the way—from the fact that the two competing contractors, Lockheed Martin and Boeing, submitted “flyoff” planes that were crude and undeveloped “technology demonstrators” rather than following the better practice of submitting fully functional prototypes, to concurrent acquisition malpractice that has prevented design flaws from being discovered until after production models were built—have led to where we are now. According to the latest annual report from the Director, Operational Test & Evaluation (DOT&E), 263 “high priority” performance and safety deficiencies remain unresolved and unaddressed, and the developmental tests—essentially, the laboratory tests—are far from complete. If they complete the tests, more deficiencies will surely be found that must be addressed before the plane can safely carry our Airmen and women into combat.

The A-10 has proven itself to be one of the most venerable and capable aircraft in the U.S. arsenal. It is also an aircraft most people in the Air Force never wanted, and they have spent years actively working to send it to the scrap yard. It is the first aircraft ever designed from the very beginning to be solely dedicated to supporting ground troops. Generations of American soldiers and Marines have come to love the jet for its unique abilities to free them from jams and help accomplish the mission. The A-10 achieved this status through a set of fortuitous events and through the efforts of a few brave and dedicated individuals who dedicated themselves to making sure the men and women fighting on the ground would receive the support they needed from the air. Pierre Sprey, one of Robert McNamara’s “whiz kids,” played a key role in the creation of the A-10, and recounts the second part of this incredible story.

The A-10 has proven itself to be one of the most venerable and capable aircraft in the US arsenal. It is also an aircraft most people in the Air Force never wanted and have spent years actively working to send it to the scrap yard. It is the first aircraft every designed from the very beginning to be solely dedicated to supporting ground troops. Generations of American soldiers and Marines have come to love the jet for its unique abilities to free them from jams and to help accomplish the mission. The A-10 achieved this status through a unique set of fortuitous events and a few brave and dedicated individuals who dedicated themselves to making sure the men and women fighting one the ground would receive the support they needed from the air. Pierre Sprey, one of Robert McNamara’s “whiz kids,” played a key role in the creation of the A-10 and recounts this incredible story.

Congress has authorized—and the Pentagon has spent—nearly $40 billion purchasing approximately 189 F-35s that, in their current configuration, will never be able to perform the way they were expected to when taxpayer dollars were used to buy them. This is hardly the right way to do business. POGO’s Jack Shanahan Military Fellow Dan Grazier explores and explains this problem further.

The doctrine of both the Army and Marine Corps are based on a foundation of mission command, a leadership philosophy where commanders tell subordinates what they want done but allow the subordinate leaders to figure out how to do it. For such a leadership philosophy to work, the entire organizational culture must be optimized for that, to include the personnel system. Don Vandergriff, a retired soldier and author, has dedicated his career to pushing these ideas. Here he talks about what steps can be taken to ensure we have the most effective and ethical military possible.

Secretary of Defense James Mattis once wrote, “Thanks to my reading, I have never been caught flat-footed by any situation, never at a loss for how any problem has been addressed (successfully or unsuccessfully) before. It doesn’t give me all the answers, but it lights what is often a dark path ahead.” He wrote this to impart the importance for military professionals to study history. In this episode, Dr. Bruce Gudmundsson, a historian at the Marine Corps University in Quantico, VA talks about why the study of history is important and how an earlier reform effort has shaped military reform in the United States.

Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist Mark Thompson has a 4 decade-long perspective covering the Pentagon. He brings this experience to the Center for Defense Information and POGO with his new column, the Military Industrial Circus.

DOT&E Releases Analysis and It Isn’t Pretty President Trump called the F-35 “fantastic.” It appears he didn’t read the latest brutally honest report from the Pentagon’s testing office. POGO wades through the complicated language of the report to show there are still many unresolved problems with the program. The F-35 still has a long way to go before it will be ready for combat. That was the parting message of Dr. Michael Gilmore, the now-retired Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, in his last annual report. The Joint Strike Fighter Program has already consumed more than $100 billion and nearly 25 years. Just to finish the basic development phase will require at least an extra $1 billion and two more years. Even with this massive investment of time and money, Dr. Gilmore told Congress, the Pentagon, and the public, “the operational suitability of all variants continues to be less than desired by the Services." What will it take to fix the numerous problems identified by Dr. Gilmore, and how do we best move forward with the most expensive weapon program in history, a program that has been unable to live up to its own very modest promises? POGO Report: http://www.pogo.org/straus/issues/weapons/2017/f35-continues-to-stumble.html 2016 DOT&E Report on the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter: https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/3262653-FY-2017-DOT-amp-E-JSF-Report.html Music: "Without Limits" Ross Bugden: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AhIeTzW9iWw

Dr. Tim Kane speaks to CDI’s Dan Grazier about his recommendations to modernize the Pentagon’s antiquated personnel system. No other issue has the potential to fundamentally reform the military than optimizing the way the Pentagon manages the men and women in uniform. Yet little has been done to update a system which has roots deeply set in early industrial age concepts of management science from more than a century ago. Military personnel today are treated by the Pentagon’s bureaucracy as little more than interchangeable cogs in the machine. Dr. Tim Kane, an economist with the Hoover Institution, has written and spoken widely on the need to modernize the Pentagon’s personnel practices. He has recently published a report detailing his recommendations and the necessary steps to ensure the military has the most effective force possible.

When the Marine Corps needed a new capstone document to capture its emerging warfighting philosophy in the 1980s, the person chosen to draft it was not a general, but a junior officer, then-captain John Schmitt. He explains how he came to write one of the most widely read military documents in the world today on the latest episode of Pentagon Labyrinth. Pentagon Labyrinth is hosted by Dan Grazier. Music: "Without Limits" by Ross Bugden

Military pilots aren’t flying as much as they used to. Rising operational costs and poor choices in the past to purchase aircraft that are too expensive to practically operate mean that many fly less than 10 hours a month. This is contributing to a shortage of skilled military pilots, which threatens our national security. Lt. Col. Carl Forsling USMC, a retired pilot who flew both the CH-46 helicopter and MV-22 tilt rotor recently wrote an article for Task & Purpose arguing pilots need a minimum of 30 hours a month in the air to develop their skills beyond the basics to gain a true mastery of tactics.

Winslow Wheeler, a veteran Capitol Hill staffer, shares his insights about what proper Congressional oversight is and provides tips for today’s young staffers on how they can be most effective in their roles providing national security oversight.