China Global

For many years, China’s nuclear doctrine was widely described as “minimum nuclear deterrence,” which essentially means that it relied on a limited number of nuclear weapons to deter an adversary from attacking. China’s authoritative defense white papers asserted that China sought to maintain a lean, effective and credible deterrent force, was committed to the policy of no first use of nuclear weapons, pursued a defensive nuclear strategy and would never enter into a nuclear arms race with any other country. In recent years, however, China has begun to expand and modernize its nuclear forces. Beijing is not transparent about its nuclear arsenal or its doctrine, however, which creates uncertainty for the United States and its allies. To help us decipher Beijing’s rapid nuclear expansion, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by John Culver, a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub and a former CIA senior intelligence officer. He is a co-author of a recent report published by the Atlantic Council titled “Adapting US Strategy to Account for China’s Transformation into a Peer Nuclear Power.”

There are many writings by Western scholars on Chinese foreign as well as domestic policy. Yet few have ventured to analyze the internal intellectual debates in China that, either partly or significantly, shape Chinese policymaking. A recent book from the European Council on Foreign Relations titled The Idea of China: Chinese Thinkers on Power, Progress, and People, intends to fill that gap. Written by Alicja Bachulska, Mark Leonard, and Janka Oertel, the book presents some of the leading Chinese perspectives on a range of contemporary global as well as domestic issues. To help us further understand Chinese thinking and its significance, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Alicja Bachulska, one of the co-authors of the book and a policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations.

The Forum on China–Africa Cooperation, or FOCAC, was established in 2000 as a platform for facilitating multilateral cooperation between the People’s Republic of China and countries in Africa. A FOCAC summit is held every three years and is the occasion to issue joint declarations and a three-year China-Africa program plan. The 2024 FOCAC took place in Beijing from September 4th to September 6th under the theme “Joining Hands to Advance Modernization and Build a High-Level China-Africa Community with a Shared Future.” Heads of state and delegations from 53 African countries attended the forum, which made it the largest diplomatic event held by China this year. To discuss the recent FOCAC meeting and Chinese interests in Africa, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Mr. Paul Nantulya who is Research Associate at the Africa Center for Strategic Studies at National Defense University. His research interests center on African security issues, and China-Afro-Asia engagements.

New Caledonia is a French territory comprising dozens of islands in the South Pacific. It possesses 25% of world’s nickel resources, a mineral critical in the development of weaponry. Several referenda on full independence from France have been held, but none have passed. In recent years, China has paid growing attention to the region, and New Caledonia is one of its targets of interest. A new report from the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), titled “When China knocks at the door of New Caledonia,” explains China’s interests, intentions, and activities in New Caledonia. It calls for greater attention to the territory and makes recommendations for the US and other regional actors to address the growing Chinese interference. To discuss Beijing’s approach to New Caledonia, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by the report’s author, Anne-Marie Brady, Professor of Political Science at the University of Canterbury in New Zealand. She specializes in Chinese domestic politics and foreign policy, polar politics, China-Pacific politics, and New Zealand foreign policy.

Most observers of China’s relations with the world maintain that China’s foreign policy started becoming more assertive beginning in the 2010s. The label “wolf warrior diplomacy” was coined by Western media to describe the aggressive language used by Chinese diplomats. The term “wolf warrior” comes from the title of the Chinese action film Wolf Warrior 2 and describes a more combative approach used by many Chinese diplomats, especially in social media and in interviews. Explanations for China’s increased diplomatic assertiveness vary, ranging from rising military and economic might to the personal leadership style of General Secretary Xi Jinping. A recently published book titled “China’s Rising Foreign Ministry,” investigates the role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in shaping and implementing Chinese foreign policy. In the words of a Southeast Asian diplomat who was interviewed by the book’s author, “China has a bigger international influence in the last five years—and it is the PRC foreign ministry that is pushing and driving it" (114). Host Bonnie Glaser is joined by the book’s author Dylan Loh Ming Hui, Assistant Professor of Public Policy and Global Affairs at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore. His research focuses on Chinese foreign policy, Southeast Asian regionalism, and Asian conceptions of the international order.

The waters, as well as the rocks, reefs and submerged shoals of the South China Sea are a major source of friction in East Asia. In recent months, tensions have flared between two of the claimants – China and the Philippines – over Second Thomas Shoal, a submerged feature in the Spratly Islands, which the Chinese call Ren Ai Jiao. In 1999, the Philippines intentionally grounded a Philippine Navy transport vessel called the Sierra Madre on the reef and since then the outpost has been manned by a small contingent of marines. In 2016, an arbitral tribunal established under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea ruled that Second Thomas Shoal is a low-tide elevation located within the exclusive economic zone of the Philippines and therefore sovereignty belongs to the Philippines. No other country can legitimately claim sovereignty over the feature or the waters around it. Beijing doesn’t recognize the ruling, even though it was legally binding on both China and the Philippines. Late last year, Chinese Coast Guard and maritime militia vessels began aggressively interfering with the Philippines’ routine missions to deliver supplies to the Filipino forces on the Sierra Madre. On several occasions, Chinese ships have used high-pressure water cannons and rammed Filipino boats. The most serious confrontation took place in mid-June, when the Chinese used axes and knives to damage multiple Philippine vessels. A Filipino navy sailor lost his thumb in the skirmish. Negotiations between Beijing and Manila in early July produced a provisional arrangement, and the Philippines subsequently successfully conducted a resupply operation. It is uncertain whether the understanding will hold, however, since Beijing and Manila publicly disagree about what has been agreed upon. To discuss the situation at Second Thomas Shoal and China’s approach to the South China Sea, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Zhang Feng, a visiting scholar at Yale Law School’s Paul Tsai China Center. His research focuses on Chinese foreign policy, international relations theory, and international relations in East Asia.

Founded in 2001, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) is a Eurasian political, economic, and security forum led by Russia and China. And on July 4, 2024, the 24th summit of the SCO was convened in Astana, Kazakhstan. The summit resulted in the Astana Declaration that reaffirmed cooperation among the member states. This year’s summit was particularly notable due to Belarus’s accession as the SCO’s first European member state and the tenth member of the SCO. The continuous enlargement of the SCO seems indicative of the organization’s shifting role, evolving from a regional cooperative forum to a broader, perhaps counter-western bloc. This episode will focus on China’s strategy in the SCO, its intentions, and its objectives. Host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Dr. Eva Seiwert, an analyst at the Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS). Her research interests include China-Russia relations, China’s central Asian relations, and China’s behavior in international organizations.

Quantum computing uses quantum mechanics to perform fast and complex calculations. It is often defined as a disruptive technology and is among the advanced technologies at the forefront of US-China competition. Although the US has been in the lead in the development and applications of quantum technology, China is making rapid strides. Earlier this year, China’s independently developed quantum computer, Origin Wukong, named after the Monkey King (a famous character from Chinese mythology) made the country the third in the world to develop this state-of-the-art machine. Quantum computing has many potential applications, including financial modeling, artificial intelligence, scientific research, as well as in defense areas, such as undersea warfare and military communications networks. A new report from the Center for a New American Security (CNAS), titled “The Quest for Qubits: Assessing U.S.-China Competition in Quantum Computing” explains the quantum strategies being pursued by the US and China. It makes recommendations for the US to strengthen its position in its competition with China in quantum computing. Host Bonnie Glaser is joined by the report’s author, Sam Howell, an adjunct associate fellow, with the Technology and National Security program at CNAS. Her research interests include quantum information science, semi-conductor STEM workforce issues, and the use of emerging technologies to enhance human performance.

On May 27th, China, Japan, and the Republic of Korea concluded their Ninth Trilateral Summit in Seoul. Leaders of the three countries resumed their highest-level annual meetings for the first time in over four years. At the conclusion of the meeting, they issued a joint declaration that includes six priority areas of cooperation, ranging from sustainable development to economic collaboration and trade. What were Beijing’s interests and motivations in reviving this trilateral mechanism? To discuss China’s participation in the trilateral summit, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Yun Sun, a Senior Fellow and Co-director of the East Asia program and Director of the China program at the Stimson Center in Washington.

On May 17, Russian President Vladimir Putin concluded a two-day visit to China for his 43rd meeting with Xi Jinping. Based on public readouts, Putin emphasized the economic benefits that the Sino-Russian partnership could bring to both countries. Economic integration between Russia and China has accelerated dramatically, with total trade between them reaching $240 billion US dollars in 2023. Beijing’s decision to increase trade with Moscow after the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine has kept the Russian economy afloat. Western sanctions have failed to cripple Russia’s economy or its war effort. After the European Union halted the import of Russian oil, China stepped in and has since become Russia’s top energy buyer. Moreover, China has become Russia’s top goods supplier, having surged its sales of machine tools, microelectronics, and other technology that Moscow uses to produce weaponry in its ongoing war with Ukraine. To discuss China’s trade with Russia, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Yanmei Xie. Yanmei is a Geopolitics Analyst at Gavekal Research, where she analyzes the implications of rising geopolitical and geoeconomic risks on trade, investments, and supply chains. Yanmei recently published a report on China’s economic support for Russia, which was titled “How China Keeps Russia in Business.”

China’s rate of economic growth has slowed markedly in recent years. According to Chinese government statistics, the economy grew by 5.2% in 2023. There are numerous challenges: weak consumer confidence, mounting local government debt, and a real estate market that used to fuel the economy, but is now in a prolonged downturn. Many economists, including some in China, advocate that the government stimulate consumer spending. It is clear, however, that Xi Jinping is pursuing a different strategy. And this was quite clear when Chinese Premier Li Qiang delivered the Government Work Report last March. Host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Tanner Greer, who argued in a recent article published in Foreign Policy and in his blog, The Scholar’s Stage, that Xi Jinping and the Politburo believe that science and technology are the answer to China’s problems. To quote from the article: “the central task of the Chinese state is to build an industrial and scientific system capable of pushing humanity to new technological frontiers.” Tanner is the director of the Center for Strategic Translation. As a journalist and researcher, his writing focuses on world politics and history.

In the past few weeks, China’s relations with Latin America and the Caribbean have been making headlines. Newsweek published an exclusive story about plans to create a Chinese-run special economic zone on the island of Antigua that will have a port, a dedicated airline, its own customs and immigration procedures, and be able to issue passports. An international crypto services zone will offer opportunities to participate in cryptocurrency operations from mining to dealing. The Americas Quarterly reported that China has expressed interest in building a port complex near the Strait of Magellan at the southern tip of South America, which is considered the most important natural passage between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. From there, according to the Americas Quarterly, Beijing could grow its presence in the region and also project influence in Antarctica. And in late April, China held the first China-Latin American and Caribbean States Space Cooperation Forum, which opened with a congratulatory letter from Xi Jinping applauding the high-level space cooperation partnership in which he emphasized the benefits of marrying China’s mature space technology with the unique geographic advantage of the countries in the Latin America and Caribbean region. To discuss Chinese interests in and strategy toward the Latin America and Caribbean region–known as the LAC–host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Leland Lazarus. He is the Associate Director of National Security at Florida International University’s Jack D. Gordon Institute of Public Policy and an expert on China-Latin America relations. He formerly served as the Special Assistant and Speechwriter to the Commander of US Southern Command and as a State Department Foreign Service Officer, with postings in Barbados and China.

The Biden administration maintains that China is the only country with both the intent to reshape the international order and the power to do so. One part of China’s economic statecraft toolkit involves state-directed investments through high profile projects in the Belt and Road Initiative which are funded by loans through Chinese development banks. But the role and impact of Chinese companies that provide equity funding for foreign direct investment (FDI) often receive less attention. Does Chinese FDI have illiberal effects on recipient countries. And is this goal part of China’s economic statecraft and foreign policy strategy. To address these questions and more, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Dr. Jan Knoerich. He is the author on a chapter of Chinese FDI on the recent Oxford publication “Rising Power, Limited Influence”, a collection of essays on the effects of Chinese investment in Europe. Dr. Knoerich is a senior lecturer on the Chinese economy for the Lau China Institute at King’s College in London. He is an expert on the Chinese economy, FDI, and international investment law and policy.

When Hong Kong was handed over to China by the United Kingdom 1997, the city was given a mini-Constitution called the “Basic Law.” Article 23 of the Basic Law states that Hong Kong shall enact laws of its own to prohibit various national security offenses. The law did not pass, however, and was scrapped after mass protests in 2003. And in 2020, the Central Government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) imposed a separate national security law on Hong Kong, citing the city’s delay in acting on Article 23. This year on March 19th, Article 23 was passed unanimously by the city’s parliament and it came into effect just days later. The law covers five types of crime: treason, insurrection and incitement to mutiny, theft of state secrets, and espionage, sabotage, and external interference. Critics say that Article 23 could lead to even further erosions of civil liberties in Hong Kong. To discuss Article 23 and its implications, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Dr. Eric Yan-ho Lai. Dr. Lai is a Research Fellow at the Georgetown Center for Asian Law, an Associate Fellow at the Hong Kong Studies Hub of the University of Surrey, and a member of the Asian Civil Society Research Network.

In the past decade, policy toward China has hardened on both sides of the Atlantic. Governments and publics across Europe and in the United States view Xi Jinping as implementing more repressive policies domestically and more aggressive policies abroad. The US and most capitals in Europe see Beijing as seeking to revise the international order in ways that would be disadvantageous to democracies. They agree on the need for de-risking and to preserve the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. Yet, despite the alignment in transatlantic assessments, cooperation on China remains limited. A new paper by experts from Chatham House and RUSI, leading think tanks in the United Kingdom, analyzes why transatlantic mechanisms have made slow progress, focusing on three domains: economics; security; and the multilateral system and global norms. The paper also offers ways to strengthen cooperation going forward. The title of the report is “Transatlantic China Policy: In Search of an Endgame?” Host Bonnie Glaser is joined by one of its authors, Ben Bland who is the director of the Asia-Pacific program at Chatham House. His research focuses on the nexus of politics, economics, and international relations in Southeast Asia, as well as China’s growing role in the broader region and the contours of US–China strategic competition.

On a previous episode of the China Global Podcast, we discussed Beijing’s position on the conflict in Gaza during the early days following Hamas’ attacks on Israel on October 7, 2023. Today, we discuss one of the conflict’s spillover effects– the attacks on cargo and trade ships transiting the Red Sea by the Houthis, an Iranian-backed Shia group governing parts of Yemen. While the Chinese-brokered rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran was as the beginning of a “wave of reconciliation” in the region by China’s foreign minister Wang Yi, the resurgence of violence since October 7th has proven that prediction to be overly optimistic. At face value, disruptions of global trade may seem to run counter to Chinese interests, but Beijing’s hesitance to become more deeply involved in the crisis may tell us something about China’s calculations in this crisis. It may also show the limits of Chinese influence in the region. Host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Ahmed Aboudouh. Ahmed is an associate fellow with the Middle East and North Africa Program at Chatham House, a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council, and heads the China Studies research unit at the Emirates Policy Center. His research focuses on China’s rising influence in the Middle East and North Africa region, Gulf geopolitics, and the effects of China-US competition worldwide.

On February 1st 2021, the Tatmadaw, or Myanmar military began a coup d’etat against the democratically-elected government, which was led by the National League for Democracy (or NLD) just before elected officials from the November 2020 elections could be sworn in. Since then, Myanmar has been largely controlled by a military junta, who continue to struggle against multiple ethnically-aligned armies dispersed throughout the country. Some countries in the region have refused to recognize the junta, but the People’s Republic of China called the coup simply a “major cabinet reshuffle” and accelerated their military trade with the junta while decrying Western sanctions on the country as escalatory measures, even going so far as to veto a security council resolution condemning the coup alongside Russia. China’s approach to relations with Myanmar since the coup have been evolving swiftly, especially since the recent Operation 1027, a large offensive staged by the ethnic armed forces coalition known as the Three Brotherhood Alliance on October 27th 2023. The losses by the junta during the operation revealed their control of the country to be more tenuous than Beijing might have expected and exemplify the complex factors going into China’s decision-making approach to the conflict. For this episode, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Jason Tower, the country director for the Burma program at the United States Institute for Peace. Tower has over 20 years of experience working in conflict and security issues in China and Southeast Asia, including analysis on cross-border investments, conflict dynamics, and organized crime in the region. He worked previously in Beijing and is a former Fulbright research student and Harvard-Yenching fellow.

Many books about US-China strategic competition have been published in recent years. This episode will focus on Facing China: The Prospect for War and Peace, which examines various flashpoints in the Indo-Pacific that could result in military conflict. There are several reasons why this book stands out: First, it includes an examination of debates within China about China’s national interests; Second, it focuses not only on the challenges of major wars, but also on China’s gray-zone strategy of deliberately pursuing its interests in ways that stay below the threshold that would trigger a US military response. And finally, it assesses the applicability of the Thucydides Trap to the US-China relationship. The Thucydides Trap concept was coined by Graham Allison who examined historical cases in which a rising power threatened to displace a ruling power in his book Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? Allison concluded that in the majority of historical cases the outcome was war. This book is especially interesting because it is written by a European expert who has deep knowledge of Taiwan, mainland China, and the United States: Jean-Pierre Cabestan. He is an emeritus senior researcher at the French Center for Scientific Research in Paris and an emeritus professor political science at the Department of Government and International Studies at Hone Kong Baptist University, and a visiting senior fellow at GMF.

On December 27 and 28, 2023, the Communist Party of China held the Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs. This was the sixth such meeting – the first one was held way back in 1971. This Foreign Affairs Work Conference was the third held under Xi Jinping’s leadership, with earlier meetings held in 2014 and 2018. Xi delivered a major speech at the Work Conference, which marks the most comprehensive expression yet of his more activist approach to PRC diplomacy. The speech provides valuable insights into Xi’s assessment of the global balance of power, his vision of the international order, and his views of the role of Chinese diplomacy. Host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Neil Thomas, a Fellow for Chinese Politics at Asia Society Policy Institute’s Center for China Analysis, where he studies elite politics, political economy, and foreign policy. Previously, he was a Senior Analyst for China and Northeast Asia at Eurasia Group.

On January 13, 2024, voters in Taiwan elected the DPP’s Lai Ching-te the next president of Taiwan. Lai won 40% of the votes–a plurality, but not a majority. In his acceptance speech, Lai pledged to safeguard Taiwan from continuing threats and intimidation from China. He also said that he has an important responsibility to maintain peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait and reiterated a statement that the current president, Tsai Ing-wen, made 8 years ago: that he would act in accordance with the Republic of China constitutional order. Beijing expected that Lai would win and was therefore well prepared. The statement, issued by the Taiwan Affairs Office shortly after the final tally was announced, emphasized that the election result would not change the trend of cross-Strait relations and said that reunification remained inevitable. It also warned against Taiwan independence and foreign interference. This episode focuses on China’s perspectives on the election and its likely reaction going forward. Host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Rick Waters, who is managing director of Eurasia Group’s China practice. He has served 27 years as a career diplomat, most recently as the inaugural head of the State Department’s Office of China Coordination and Deputy Secretary of State for China and Taiwan.

This episode covers the role of US and Chinese domestic politics in the US-China relationship. There are many drivers of US-China strategic competition, and domestic politics is among them, and has become increasingly important, though it has not been well researched and analyzed in recent years. One reason for the lack of analysis on Chinese politics is that since Xi Jinping became China’s top leader in 2012, domestic politics in China has become even more of black box than previously. Bonnie is joined by Dr. Evan Medeiros, who has recently published a pathbreaking study that seeks to update the understanding of political forces in China and the United States that are influencing the bilateral relationship. Medeiros is one of the world’s leading experts on Chinese foreign policy. He is the Penner Family Chair in Asia studies and the Cling Family Distinguished Fellow in US-China Studies in the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. The report we will discuss today is titled: "The New Domestic Politics of US-China Relations" and was published by the Asia Society Policy Institute’s Center for China Analysis where Evan is a senior fellow for foreign policy. During the Obama administration, Evan was on the NSC staff, first as director for China, Taiwan and Mongolia, and then as special assistant to the president and Senior Director for Asia.

This podcast episode is a joint and cross-over episode between the CSIS ChinaPower Podcast and the German Marshall Fund’s China Global Podcast. We are joined by Bonnie Glaser, Jessica Chen Weiss, and Thomas Christensen to discuss their recently released article titled “Taiwan and the True Sources of Deterrence.” The authors underline the article’s key point, that assurances, alongside threats, are an integral part of effective deterrence. They emphasize that in order for deterrence to work, the threat of punishment must be not only credible but also conditional. Finally, the authors outline what actions each of the three actors- the U.S., China, and Taiwan- should take to effectively convey assurances to one another. Ms. Bonnie Glaser is the managing director of the German Marshall Fund’s Indo-Pacific program. She is also a nonresident fellow with the Lowy Institute in Sydney, Australia, and a senior associate with the Pacific Forum. She was previously senior adviser for Asia and the director of the China Power Project at CSIS. Ms. Glaser has worked at the intersection of Asia-Pacific geopolitics and U.S. policy for more than three decades. Dr. Jessica Chen Weiss is a professor for China and Asia-Pacific Studies in the Department of Government at Cornell University. She was previously an assistant professor at Yale University and founded the Forum for American/Chinese Exchange at Stanford University. Formerly, Dr. Weiss served as senior advisor to the Secretary’s Policy Planning Staff at the U.S. State Department on a Council on Foreign Relations Fellowship for Tenured International Relations Scholars. Dr. Thomas Christensen is a professor of Public and International Affairs and Director of the China and World Program at Columbia University. Prior to this, he served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs with responsibility for relations with China, Taiwan, and Mongolia. His research and teaching focus is on China’s foreign relations, the international relations of East Asia, and international security.

Early next month, the European Union and China are set to hold the 24th bilateral summit. The last EU-China summit was held via video conference in April 2022. It took place against the background of China’s countermeasures to EU sanctions on human rights, Chinese economic coercion and trade measures against the single market, and most importantly, Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine and Beijing’s unwillingness to condemn the invasion. Earlier this year, the European Council reaffirmed the EU’s multifaceted policy approach towards China, which is based on the judgment that China is simultaneously a partner, a competitor, and a systemic rival. However, that balancing act is getting more and more difficult. Host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Mr. Gunnar Wiegand, who has recently retired from the post of Managing Director for Asia and the Pacific at the European External Action Service, which he held for 7 ½ years. He is now a visiting professor at the College of Europe and the Paris School of International Affairs, and as of November 1, 2023, he has joined GMF’s Indo-Pacific program as a visiting distinguished fellow.

On the morning of October 07, 2023, Hamas launched an unprovoked attack from the Gaza Strip, indiscriminately killing more than 1,400 Israeli and foreign nationals. Over 200 civilians, including women and children, were taken to Gaza as hostages. IN response to this attack, as well as subsequent attacks launched from Lebanon and Syria, Israel began an unprecedented bombing campaign of Gaza and targeted Hezbollah and Syrian government military positions. The conflict is unlikely to end soon and may spread. While the conflict itself demands global attention, the focus of this podcast is Chinese foreign and security policy. This discussion focuses on China’s response to the war, China’s relations with Palestine and Israel, and the actions that Beijing might take in the coming weeks and months that could help defuse the conflict or cause it to worsen. To date, China has not condemned Hamas. Instead, it has criticized what it calls Israel’s disproportionate military response and the “collective punishment of the Gazan people.” Moreover, it has trumpeted its position as an unbiased potential mediator and called for a ceasefire and the implementation of a two-state solution. Host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Tuvia Gering, who, like many Israelis, has been activated to defend his country. Gering is a leading expert on China and its relations with the Middle East. In his civilian capacity, he is a researcher at the Diane & Guilford Glazer Foundation’s Israel-China Policy Center at the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv and a nonresident fellow for the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub.

On August 1, 2017, China official opened its first overseas military base in the East African nation of Djibouti. The base, constructed to provide logistical support to the Chinese navy’s counter-piracy mission off the coast of Somalia, marked a major step toward Xi Jinping’s goal of constructing a world class military by the middle of the century. The US Defense Department has just released its annual China Military Power Report, and that says that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) probably has also considered adding military logistics facilities in 19 countries around the world (in addition to Djibouti): Cambodia, Burma, Thailand, Indonesia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, United Arab Emirates, Kenya, Equatorial Guinea, Seychelles, Tanzania, Angola, Nigeria, Namibia, Mozambique, Bangladesh, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, and Tajikistan. To expand its global footprint, People’s Liberation Army (PLA) will need to cultivate good relations with potential host countries. China’s military diplomacy is likely aimed at achieving that objective among others. Today’s discussion focuses on the key features and goals of China’s military diplomacy and its quest for additional military installations – or what the Chinese call “strategic strongpoints.” Host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Kristin Gunness, a senior policy researcher at the RAND Corporation. She previously served as the Director of the Navy Asia Pacific Advisory Group at the Pentagon, advising the Chief of Naval Operations on security and foreign policy trends in the Indo-Pacific, focusing on Chinese naval and gray zone warfare capabilities. Earlier this year, Kristin testified on China’s overseas military diplomacy and its implications for American interests at a hearing convened by the US Economic and Security Review Commission.

On this episode of the China Global podcast, the relationship between the Philippines and China, and some of the flashpoints therein (especially in the maritime realm), will be discussed. Since taking office in June 2022, President Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr. has pursued a strategy of “being a friend to all and an enemy to none.” He has tried to maintain close economic ties with China, signing 14 cooperation agreements when he visited Beijing last January, including an updated Belt and Road Initiative memorandum. He secured over $22 billion in investment and trade deals. But the maritime disputes between the Philippines and China are becoming more contentious, and Manila is pushing back against Chinese pressure in new ways. Host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Richard Heydarian to analyze the bilateral relationship and especially the maritime flashpoints. Heydarian is a columnist at the Philippine Daily Inquirer, a Senior Lecturer at the University of the Philippines, and a policy adviser. His most recent book is The Indo-Pacific: Trump, China, and the New Global Struggle for Mastery.

In late August, China’s Ministry of Natural Resources released its new “standard map,” which includes not only Taiwan, but also parts of the maritime zones of the Philippines, Vietnam, Brunei, Indonesia, and Malaysia. It also includes land that China disputes with India—and even some Russian territory. To publicize the map and China’s claims, Beijing launched a “national map awareness publicity week,” as it has for map releases in recent years. China’s map release is an annual event, which can happen at any time. So why now? And what does the map tell us about Chinese foreign policy under Xi Jinping? To discuss this topic, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Dr. Collin Koh who is Senior Fellow at the Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, based in Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. He has research interests on naval affairs in the Indo-Pacific, focusing on Southeast Asia.

In 2001, Goldman Sachs economist Jim O’Neill coined the term “BRIC” to describe the fast-growing economies that he predicted would collectively dominate the global economy by 2050. The BRIC countries he was referring to were Brazil, Russia, India, and China. After a series of high-level meetings that included officials from the four countries, the BRIC grouping was founded in 2009. The following year, South Africa joined, and the name became “BRICS”. Last month, the fifteenth BRICS summit was held in Johannesburg. In addition to the leaders of the five core countries, representatives from more than 60 countries attended, and six were officially invited to join the club: Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. How does the BRICS serve China’s foreign policy objectives? And is this expansion a major win for Xi Jinping? Is BRICS likely to become a global grouping of authoritarian countries that poses a challenge to the G-7 group of democracies – and is that what Beijing wants? To discuss these topics and more, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Colleen Cottle, deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub. Prior to joining the Atlantic Council, she spent over a dozen years at the Central Intelligence Agency where she worked on East and South Asia.

Earlier this summer, there was an unexpected shakeup in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Rocket Force. Commander Li Yuchao was removed along with his deputy Liu Guangbin and a former deputy Zhang Zhenzhong. All three men are reportedly under investigation for disciplinary violations by the Central Military Commission’s anti-corruption unit. Xi Jinping appointed Wang Houbin, former deputy commander of the navy, as head of the Rocket Force, and Xu Xiesheng, from the air force as political commissar. The PLA’s Rocket Force, established on January 1, 2016, is the successor to the Second Artillery Corps. It has responsibility for China’s growing arsenal of land-based ballistic and cruise missiles, both nuclear and conventional. What is the significance of this reshuffle in the PLA’s most sensitive branch? What implications do the appointments of new commanders from other parts of the military have for PLA readiness and preparations for a Taiwan invasion scenario? To discuss these questions, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Dr. Phillip Saunders, Director of the Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs and a Distinguished Research Fellow at the National Defense University’s Institute of National Strategic Studies. Dr. Saunder’s most recent publication is a study he conducted with David Logan on the drivers of China’s nuclear force development. The views he expresses today are his own and do not represent the National Defense University or the US Department of Defense.

Technology is the focus of the intensifying competition between the United States and China, and Artificial Intelligence (AI) is at the core. China views AI as a means to gain a strategic advantage over the United States and its allies. It intends to use AI to build a world-class military. Beijing also views AI as an enabler of surveillance and repression that can help to bolster its illiberal model of governance. China’s national AI strategy calls for a vast expansion of AI in manufacturing, governance, and national defense, with China becoming a global leader in the field by 2030 through multiple AI technology innovations and personnel training centers. To discuss this topic, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Gregory Allen, director of the Wadhwani Center for AI and Advanced Technologies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Before joining CSIS, he was the director of strategy and policy at the Department of Defense (DOD) Joint Artificial Intelligence Center, where he oversaw development and implementation of the DOD’s AI Strategy, drove policy and human capital reforms to accelerate the DOD’s adoption of AI, and developed mechanisms for AI governance and ethics.

Critical minerals are non-fuel minerals or mineral materials essential to the economic or national security of the U.S. They have no viable substitutes yet face a high risk of supply chain disruption. Critical minerals are used for many different purposes, including the production of advanced electronics, weapons systems, manufacturing equipment, and cutting-edge medical devices. They are indispensable for the transition to low-carbon energy sources. Last year, the U.S. Secretary of the Interior, with the aid of the U.S. Geological Survey, published a list of 50 critical minerals. China dominates global critical mineral supply chains, accounting for approximately 60% of world-wide production and 85% of processing capacity. However, the U.S. and several European countries are taking steps to build out their own ability to mine, process, and manufacture critical minerals. To discuss the implications of China’s role in critical mineral supply chains and the responses of the U.S. and its partners, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Abigail Wulf, vice president and director of the Ambassador Alfred Hoffman Jr. Center for Critical Minerals Strategy at Security America’s Future Energy (SAFE), a non-profit advancing transformative transportation technology to enhance energy security.

A new Foreign Relations Law took effect in China on July 1, 2023 that formalizes Chinese Communist Party leadership in all foreign policy matters. It puts China’s security and development interests and global rise at the center of its engagement with the world. The new law has been widely interpreted as providing a legal basis for Beijing’s struggle against what it says is a strategy of containment by the United States and its allies, and against foreign interference and sanctions, as well as what is calls America’s “long-arm jurisdiction.” To discuss the Foreign Relations Law, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Dr. Moritz Rudolf, a Research Scholar in Law and Fellow at Yale Law School’s Paul Tsai China Center, where he focuses on the implications of China’s rise for the international legal order.

Relations between the United States and China have slid to their lowest point since the 1970s. After President Biden and Xi Jinping met in November 2022, they instructed their senior officials to initiate a process to stabilize the relationship. Before much headway could be made, however, China sent a surveillance balloon to the west coast of the United States that ended up loitering over sensitive military sites and then flew across the entire country before being shot down by the US. Secretary of State Blinken postponed his planned visit to China. Acrimony and distrust spiked. Several months later, the US and China decided to try again. Blinken visited Beijing from June 18-19, and had meetings with Chinese President Xi Jinping, CCP Central Foreign Affairs Office Director Wang Yi, and State Councilor and Foreign Minister Qin Gang. What is the trajectory of the bilateral relationship after the visit? Is it possible to stabilize ties and resume dialogue mechanisms and some forms of cooperation, or is further deterioration of relations more likely? To discuss these issues, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Dr. Evan Medeiros, the Penner Family Chair in Asia Studies in the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, and the Cling Family Distinguished Fellow in U.S.-China Studies. During the Obama administration, Evan served for six years on the National Security Council as Director for China, Taiwan, and Mongolia.

On June 3, 2023, there was a near-collision between a US and a PRC destroyer in the Taiwan Strait. According to a statement issued by US Indo-Pacific Command, a US Navy destroyer, the USS Chung-Hoon, and a Canadian warship were conducting a routine south to north Taiwan Strait transit through waters where high seas freedoms of navigation and overflight apply. The Luyang III, a People’s Liberation Army destroyer, overtook the Chung-Hoon on her port side and crossed her bow at 150 yards. The US warship maintained course and slowed to 10 knots to avoid a collision. US Indo-Pacific Command stated that the actions of the Chinese destroyer violated the maritime Rules of the Road of safe passage in international waters. How dangerous was this incident? Why do US warships sail in these waters, and do they do so in accordance with international law? And what steps should be taken to ensure that accidents do not take place between US and Chinese naval vessels? To discuss these questions, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Dr. Peter Dutton, professor of international law in the Stockton Center for International Law at the US Naval War College and an Adjunct Professor of Law at New York University School of Law. His research focuses on international law of the sea, Chinese views of sovereignty and international law, and China’s maritime expansion.

Switzerland was one of the first countries to recognize the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1950. China is Switzerland’s third most important trading partner, with a free trade agreement that has been in effect since 2014. Since 2018, their senior foreign affairs officials have held an annual strategic dialogue. The Chair of Swiss financial services giant UBS Group has described Swiss businesses as “very pro-China.” Since the launch of their bilateral stock exchange agreement last year, Chinese companies have raised more shares in Zurich than it has in the United States. But there is also growing friction in the Swiss-Chinese relationship. In its recently released China Strategy, Switzerland called out the PRC’s increasing “authoritarian tendencies,” and cited China’s human rights violations. At the same time, Switzerland’s relations with Taiwan are expanding against Beijing’s wishes. In February, the Swiss parliament sent a delegation to Taiwan, where they were received by Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen. What’s driving these changes in Swiss-Chinese relations? With its democratic values and open economy, how does Bern reconcile its principle of neutrality with the challenges posed by Beijing? To discuss evolving ties between Switzerland and China, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Dr. Simona Grano, Senior Lecturer and Director of the Taiwan Studies Project at the University of Zurich. Her latest co-edited book is titled, China-US Competition: Impact on Small and Middle Powers' Strategic Choices.

In a speech delivered in 2014, Chinese leader Xi Jinping said, “Efforts should be made to build our country into a cyber power.” Under national strategies such as Building Digital China, the Digital Silk Road, and China Standards 2035, Beijing seeks not only the digital transformation of the nation but also aspires to play a leading role in the global digital order. How should we understand Beijing’s ambition to become a cyber superpower and have digital sovereignty? What is China’s role in the global digital space today and how do Chinese digital platforms advance China’s influence? To discuss these questions, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Peter Raymond, a nonresident senior associate with the economics program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). He has a 30-year career of service at the intersection of the public and private sectors of infrastructure and financial services. He is author of a recently released CSIS report titled, “Re-platformed Planet? Implications of the Rise and Spread of Chinese Platform Technologies.”

According to estimates by the International Monetary Fund, 60% of low-income countries are now in or at high risk of debt distress, double the number in 2015. Zambia defaulted on its public debt two years ago. Sri Lanka, Ghana, Ethiopia and Pakistan have already defaulted or are on the cusp of doing so. In all these cases, China is a significant creditor. China’s lending of projects in other countries between 2000 and 2017 totaled more than $800 billion. In the past five years, Beijing’s lending has tapered off, but it has left a trail of unsustainable debt. China’s role in sovereign debt restructuring is under scrutiny and criticism. Beijing has been reluctant to participate in multilateral debt restructuring unless the World Bank and other regional development banks also agree to write down their own loans. The World Bank dismisses that demand, arguing that development bank financing already comes with low interest rates and does not add significantly to a country’s debt burden. What is China’s approach to debt relief and should it be doing more? To discuss these topics and more, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Jeremy Mark, a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center, who writes on developing country debt and US-China issues. He worked in Asia for The Wall Street Journal early in his career and as a communications specialist for the International Monetary Fund for over two decades, where he was responsible for its communications in Africa and Asia.

China’s use of industrial policies is neither new nor unique, but only in the last decade has the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) provided systematic support to frontier technologies such as artificial intelligence, robotics, and communications. President Xi Jinping announced in 2015 a “Made in China 2025” plan whose aim is Chinese global dominance in 20 key sectors including information technology, green energy technology, and semiconductors. Since then, the CCP has become increasingly involved in private-sector innovation to build Chinese self-sufficiency in cutting-edge technologies. The CCP does not reveal official data on state subsidies but estimates of expenditures range from 1.7% to 4.9% of GDP, far surpassing any other nation’s spending on industrial policy. Yet the success of these costly measures is at best uneven, especially in the crucial semiconductor sector, where China’s design and manufacturing challenges are now compounded by US-led export controls. To discuss Chinese industrial policies and their overlap with Chinese foreign policy, host Bonnie Glaser speaks with John Lee, director of East West Futures, a political and risk consultancy that focuses on China. Lee is also a researcher with the Leiden Asia Center and has worked for the Australian Department of Defense, the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and the Mercator Institute for China Studies. Lee’s research focuses on China’s semiconductor-related industries, cyberspace governance, and the future of telecommunications networks.

The terminology of international relations is important to understand, but that task is challenging because shared definitions of key words do not always exist. China’s government and party-state actors, for example, often interpret terms in ways that differ from the American and European understanding of them. Chinese concepts of democracy, rule of law, and human rights are not those of the West. As Beijing seeks to inject its norms into the international order and lead global governance reform, knowing the differences is important. To discuss these topics, Bonnie is joined by Malin Oud, director of the Stockholm office of the Raoul Wallenberg Institute of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, where she also heads the institute’s China program. Oud has worked on human rights and sustainable development in China in various capacities for more than 20 years, and was based in Beijing from 2000 to 2009. Two years ago, Malin co-authored The Decoding China Dictionary. In early March, she co-edited the dictionary’s second edition, which includes 26 terms. It is an invaluable resource for understanding Chinese foreign and domestic policies.

Overdoses on fentanyl and other synthetic opioids are the leading cause of death for Americans under the age of 45. China was for years the world’s primary source of fentanyl, but that changed when the country, in 2019, effectively banned fentanyl exports to the United States, a move that the Trump administration hailed. The celebration, unfortunately, was premature. Chinese chemical and shipping companies began instead selling precursor chemicals for manufacturing fentanyl to Mexican drug cartels, which subsequently smuggled the illicit material into the United States. Beijing denies that it is the cause of the US fentanyl crisis and blames the US pharmaceutical industry’s power and American social problems. US-China cooperation on counternarcotics efforts yielded results in the past, but such collaboration is constantly in flux. The two countries’ law enforcement agencies, for example, conducted joint investigations that led to convictions of fentanyl traffickers in 2019. But despite that success, China suspended, in the wake of former House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s 2022 visit to Taiwan, bilateral cooperation in, among other critical areas, counternarcotics activity. The Biden administration is eager to restart cooperation to curb the fentanyl trade. To discuss China’s role in the fentanyl crisis, host Bonnie Glaser speaks with Dr. Vanda Felbab-Brown, a foreign policy senior fellow at the Brookings Institution’s Strobe Talbott Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology. Felbab-Brown is also director of the Initiative on Nonstate Armed Actors and co-director of the Brookings series “The Opioid Crisis in America: Domestic and International Dimensions”. Her book, Narco Noir: Mexico’s Cartels, Cops, and Corruption, will be released in January 2025.

Two and a half years after China imposed trade restrictions on more than one dozen Australian products, bilateral trade may be returning to normal as the diplomatic thaw between Canberra and Beijing gains momentum. Chinese trade bans on products like coal, lime, lobster, timber, and barley were imposed after former Prime Minister Scott Morrison called for an independent investigation into the origins of COVID-19 in September 2020. Relations began to warm this past November when Chinese leader Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Anthony Albanese met at the G-20 Summit in Bali, Indonesia. Since then, there have been meetings between the two countries’ foreign ministers and a virtual meeting between trade ministers. Early this year, China resumed coal imports from Australia, and some speculate the coal ban may soon be lifted completely. In another sign of warming ties, the Australian government approved a 1.38 billion US dollars Chinese investment in an iron ore joint venture, which is the largest Chinese investment in Australia since 2019. So, what explains China’s sudden about face in its approach to Canberra? What does China seek to gain in return if anything? And is Canberra likely to moderate its approach toward Beijing to sustain the positive momentum? To discuss China’s new approach to Australia, the motivating factors behind it, and the potential future course of China-Australia relations, host Bonnie Glaser speaks with Dr. Benjamin Herscovitch, a research fellow at the Australian National University’s School of Regulation and Global Governance and National Security College, whose research focuses on China’s economic statecraft and Australia-China relations. He is also the writer of Beijing to Canberra and Back, a fortnightly newsletter on Substack, that analyzes Australia-China ties. Previously, he was an analyst and policy officer in Australia’s Department of Defence.

China’s newly appointed foreign minister, Qin Gang, upheld a 33-year tradition by making his first trip since taking office to Africa. Gang visited Ethiopia, Angola, Gabon, Benin, and Egypt. Chinese President Xi Jinping has prominently elevated the continent as a foreign policy priority and himself traveled there ten times between 2014 and 2020. After Beijing launched its Belt and Road Initiative in 2013, Chinese investment in Africa surged, peaking at $28.4 billion in 2016. For 2020 the figure was only $1.9 billion, lowered, in part, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, changing Chinese priorities, and African governments’ difficulties repaying Chinese loans. Meanwhile, President Joe Biden’s administration has deepened US engagement with Africa. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen and US Ambassador to the United Nations Linda Thomas-Greenfield visited in January. A month before that, Biden hosted 49 African leaders at the United States-Africa Leaders Summit in Washington, DC. He announced then that he will visit sub-Saharan Africa later this year, the first trip there by a US president in a decade. To discuss China’s interests and US-China competition in Africa, host Bonnie Glaser speaks with Dr. Joshua Eisenman, associate professor of politics at the Keough School of Global Affairs at the University of Notre Dame. Eisenman’s research focuses on China’s development and its relations with the Global South, particularly Africa. His forthcoming book, "China’s Relations with Africa: A New Era of Strategic Engagement," co-authored with Ambassador David Shinn, will be available this summer.

On January 28 , just days before US Secretary of State Antony Blinken was due to travel to Beijing, a high-altitude Chinese surveillance balloon carrying a payload the size of three buses entered the US Air Defense Identification Zone north of the Aleutian Islands. It drifted eastward, over Alaska and Canada, before reaching the continental United States. Officials in Washington claim that the balloon’s entry into US airspace, not to mention its loitering over sensitive military installations in Montana, violated American sovereignty and international law. US President Joe Biden, advised that the balloon posed no immediate threat and that shooting it down over land risked harm to civilians and property, ordered the military to end the balloon’s meanderings once it reached the Atlantic Ocean. Blinken’s trip was postponed. The Chinese expressed regret about the intrusion, maintaining that the vessel was a weather balloon that had gone off course. Beijing also condemned the decision to shoot it down, saying the act was a “clear overreaction and a serious violation of international practice”. The Chinese indicated that they reserved the right to respond. To discuss China’s intelligence operations and the implications of the surveillance balloon for US-China relations, host Bonnie Glaser speaks with retired Senior Intelligence Officer John Culver. He worked at the Central Intelligence Agency for 35 years analyzing East Asian affairs, including those related to China and the People’s Liberation Army. From 2015 to 2018, he was the National Intelligence Council’s national intelligence officer for East Asia.

“As close as lips and teeth.” So described Mao Zedong China’s relationship with North Korea, the only country with which, since 1961, China has a mutual defense treaty. But many sources of bilateral friction exist, including North Korea’s nuclear weapons program and China’s close relationship with South Korea. Recent regional and global developments are now causing China to adjust its policy toward North Korea. The war in Ukraine may be driving the two countries closer together, as evidenced by Beijing’s veto last May of a draft UN Security Council resolution aimed at tightening sanctions against Pyongyang. This was the first time China wielded its veto on the issue. Since 2006, the Security Council approved ten similar resolutions unanimously. Given China’s new stance, how would it respond if North Korea conducts a nuclear test in the coming months? To discuss China’s evolving policy, host Bonnie Glaser speaks with Yun Sun, a senior fellow and co-director of the East Asia Program, and director of the China Program, at the Stimson Center.

President Xi Jinping smiled when he met his US counterpart, Joe Biden, on the margins of last November’s G20 summit in Indonesia. Xi also struck a moderate tone in his remarks and in meetings with several other leaders, especially Australia’s new prime minister, Anthony Albanese. Are we seeing a shift in Chinese foreign policy? If so, is it tactical or more strategic? And what is driving it? The National Security Council Coordinator for the Indo-Pacific, Kurt Campbell, recently suggested that the Chinese have recognized that certain elements of their foreign policy, such as their wolf-warrior diplomacy, have been unsuccessful and, in many respects, have backfired. Other experts speculate that Xi needs to focus attention on addressing mounting domestic economic and pandemic challenges , and consequently needs a more favorable external environment including, in particular, reduced tensions with the United States. To discuss the factors shaping current Chinese foreign policy and the direction China’s approach to the world is taking, host Bonnie Glaser speaks with Ryan Hass, a senior fellow in the Center for East Asia Policy Studies and the Chen-fu and Cecilia Yen Koo Chair in Taiwan Studies at the Brookings Institution.

In early December, Chinese President Xi Jinping traveled to Saudi Arabia for a three-day trip, his first to the country since 2016. Xi met with King Salman and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and signed a strategic partnership agreement with the Kingdom, which promises to usher in a “new era” of China-Saudi relations. Xi also held a summit with six Gulf Cooperation Council countries and a China-Arab States Summit with leaders from 21 countries of the Arab League. To discuss Xi’s visit and China’s policy towards the Middle East and North Africa, host Bonnie Glaser speaks with Dr. Jonathan Fulton, an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Zayed University in Abu Dhabi, a non-resident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, and the host of the China-MENA Podcast.

Following the COP 27 climate change summit in Egypt and preceding the oncoming winter, energy security is a concern for many countries. China, which has become a major player in global energy markets, is no exception. Its willingness to buy Russian oil and sell excess liquefied natural gas (LNG) to Europe has significantly influenced energy flows in 2022. Unsurprisingly, energy security has been among Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s priorities. He has said that China “must hold the energy food bowl in its own hands”. The country is a significant consumer of renewables and fossil fuels, and its changing energy mix and overseas energy investments impacts the world’s ability to combat global warming. To discuss the evolution of China’s energy policy and its influence on global energy markets, host Bonnie Glaser speaks with Dr. Erica Downs, senior research scholar at the Center on Global Energy Policy at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs. Dr. Downs previously worked as a senior research scientist in the China Studies program of the CNA Corporation, as a senior analyst in the Asia practice at Eurasia Group, as an energy analyst at the Central Intelligence Agency, and as a lecturer at the Foreign Affairs College in Beijing.

China has been a member of the United Nations and the UN Security Council since its founding. UN Resolution 2758, which expelled the Republic of China and gave its seat to the People’s Republic of China (PRC), marked a turning point in the PRC’s diplomatic representation and led to the normalization of relations with many countries, including the United States. Over time, China became an active participant in the UN and its influence increased dramatically. In 2020, China headed four of the 15 principal specialized agencies of the UN and had deputies in nine other agencies. In his speech at the 20th Party Congress in October, China’s leader Xi Jinping said that “China is firm in safeguarding the international system with the United Nations at its core,” reiterating the importance that China attaches to the UN in the international system. Beijing’s agenda in the United Nations provides important clues about its views of the global order and how it seeks to revise that order to defend and advance its interests. At times, China has voted alongside the United States and its allies, such as when sanctions were imposed on North Korea for conducting nuclear weapons tests. However, on other issues, such as human rights and the war in Ukraine, Beijing has adopted opposing positions. To discuss China’s policy toward the UN, host Bonnie Glaser speaks with Dr. Courtney Fung, an associate professor in the Department of Security Studies & Criminology at Macquarie University in Sydney, Australia. Fung is also an associate fellow at both Chatham House and the Lowy Institute and her book, China and Intervention at the UN Security Council: Reconciling Status (2019), examines China’s engagement with the UN.

On November 4, Germany’s Chancellor Olaf Scholz visited China, marking the first time that a G7 country’s leader met with President Xi Jinping since the beginning of the coronavirus pandemic and since Xi secured a third term in power. It was also their first in-person meeting since Scholz took over the Chancellery from long-time leader Angela Merkel in 2021 and since the conclusion of the 20th Party Congress of the Chinese Communist Party and Xi’s further consolidation of power. To assess the outcomes of Chancellor Scholz’s trip and Germany’s policy toward China, host Bonnie Glaser speaks with Noah Barkin, a visiting senior fellow at the German Marshall Fund and Managing Editor at the Rhodium Group’s China Practice. Barkin writes about European policy toward China in his monthly Watching China in Europe newsletter.

From October 16 to 22, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) held its 20th Party Congress. The Party Congress is held every five years to reshuffle the Party’s top leadership, followed by a political report delivered by the Party General Secretary. This report reviews the achievements of the past five years and sets priorities for the next five years. During the 20th Party Congress, Xi Jinping secured a third term as General Secretary of the CCP and Chairman of the Central Military Commission. In spring 2023, the National People’s Congress will elect the next president of the People’s Republic of China and minister of foreign affairs. China watchers around the world have been closely tracking the personnel changes and analyzing the Party Congress political report. To analyze some of the crucial elements of that report and discuss the impact of the Party Congress on China’s foreign policy strategy, host Bonnie Glaser speaks with Dr. Bates Gill. Gill is the executive director of the newly established Center for China Analysis at the Asia Society Policy Institute. Gill has authored or edited nine books on China and Asia, including Daring to Struggle: China’s Global Ambitions under Xi Jinping, which was published in June 2022.

Over the last two decades, China has invested in the international media system to shape different populations’ public opinion on China and to suppress anti-China media narratives. Its investments include funding media organizations and communications infrastructure in targeted countries, engaging with foreign publics on social media, launching dis- and misinformation campaigns, training journalists, and other strategies. In the process, independent, objective journalism has been eroded, thus challenging the resiliency of governments, civil society, and the media. To discuss China’s investments in and impact on international media, host Bonnie Glaser speaks with Sarah Cook, research director for China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan at Freedom House. Cook is one of the lead authors on Freedom House’s recently published report, Beijing’s Global Media Influence 2022. She also directs the China Media Bulletin, an English and Chinese monthly digest on China-related media freedom developments.

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit took place on September 15–16 in Uzbekistan's Samarkand. The leaders of China, Russia, India, Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan, as well as the leaders of observer countries Iran, Belarus, and Mongolia attended. In addition, the leaders of Azerbaijan, Türkiye, and Turkmenistan joined the summit as special guests. This was the first in-person SCO summit since June 2019 and was also Chinese President Xi Jinping’s first trip outside of China since early 2020. As the SCO marks 21 years since its founding, the question remains: has it achieved Beijing’s goals and advanced Chinese interests? To discuss the SCO as well as China’s interests and role in Central Asia, host Bonnie Glaser speaks with Vina Nadjibulla, an adjunct professor at the School of Public Policy and Global Affairs at the University of British Columbia. Her current research focuses on China’s diplomacy in multilateral and regional organizations. Nadjibulla previously worked at the United Nations headquarters in New York and in peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions in West and Central Africa. Born in the Soviet Union, raised in Afghanistan, and educated in the United States, Nadjibulla has also worked and lived in China and Central Asia.

In 1978, China was a nearly autarkic country. But in the 30 years that followed, the country transitioned to become the world’s largest manufacturer and goods exporter. Today, China is a major actor in global value chains, accounting for nearly 20 percent of global manufacturing trade and an even greater share of many intermediate global value chain inputs that are essential for production. So how did China become so deeply integrated into global supply chains? What has been the role of industrial policies in China’s achievement of supply chain dominance? To answer these questions and to discuss China’s dominance in global supply chains, host Bonnie Glaser speaks with Dr. David J. Bulman, the Jill McGovern and Steven Muller Assistant Professor of China Studies and International Affairs and the US Director of the Pacific Community Initiative at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. His research examines economic and political development in China and the implications for US-China relations.

In early August, Nancy Pelosi, the Speaker of the United States House of Representatives, visited Taiwan. Her visit was met with harsh condemnation by Beijing, followed by a Chinese ban on thousands of Taiwanese food imports, from fruits and vegetables to cookies and baby food. In addition, China suspended or canceled various dialogues with the United States. The Chinese military, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), conducted a series of provocative exercises around Taiwan. These actions were reminiscent of when China fired missiles into the waters around the island in 1995–1996 after Taiwan’s then-President Lee Teng-hui visited the United States. Of course, the PLA’s capabilities have evolved significantly over the past 25 years, and the current round of military drills reflected some of this progress. In this episode, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by John Culver to discuss the military exercises and China’s intentions and capabilities. Culver is currently a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub. Previously he was a National Intelligence Officer for East Asia and a Central Intelligence Agency analyst.

On April 21, China’s President Xi Jinping proposed a new Global Security Initiative (GSI) during a keynote speech at the Boao Forum for Asia Annual Conference. Like Xi’s other big ideas, such as the Belt and Road Initiative and the Global Development Initiative, GSI is heavy on principles and light on concrete details.   Described as “another global public good that contributes Chinese solutions and wisdom to addressing the world’s security challenges” by China’s state media, the GSI rests on six pillars. Some of them, like respecting sovereignty and territorial integrity, are long-standing features of Chinese foreign policy. However, the GSI also has new components, including upholding “indivisible security.” To unpack the Global Security Initiative and its components, Bonnie Glaser is joined by Manoj Kewalramani, chairperson of the Indo-Pacific Research Programme and a China Studies fellow at the Takshashila Institution in India. He is also a non-resident senior associate with the Freeman Chair in China Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC. Kewalramani publishes “Tracking People’s Daily,” a newsletter that offers a breakdown of the weekday editions of the People’s Daily.

Rodrigo Duterte, the former president of the Philippines, tried to improve ties with China during his presidency in the hope of securing economic benefits for the country. However, those efforts did not see fruition. During his 2022 presidential campaign, Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos, Jr. did not openly criticize Duterte’s China policy. In fact, he argued that the policy of engagement was correct, saying “we don’t want to go to war with China” over the South China Sea. Moreover, the Marcos family has maintained warm ties with Beijing throughout the decades. But changes are afoot. The newly elected President Marcos is adopting a tougher stance on the South China Sea disputes and calling for a renegotiation of loan agreements with China for railway projects worth almost $5 billion. In today’s episode of China Global, Bonnie Glaser is joined by Dr. Charmaine Willoughby, Associate Professor of International Studies at De La Salle University in Manila. They discuss the past, present, and future developments in the China-Philippines relationship and examine how the relationship may change under the new Marcos government.

Though China’s overseas development program has a long history, it greatly expanded after the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative in 2013. Since then, debates have emerged among policymakers, scholars, and journalists about the objectives and impacts of China’s lending and grant-giving activities. Various charges levied against Beijing include that its development programs seek to prop up corrupt and authoritarian regimes and saddle countries with unsustainable debts. Some observers also claim that Chinese projects are not substantially contributing to economic development in recipient countries. Uncovering the facts is challenging because China’s overseas financing is shrouded in secrecy. Gathering data is possible, but enormously time-consuming. In this episode, Bonnie Glaser speaks with Dr. Bradley Parks, executive director of AidData, where he leads a team of 35 program evaluators, policy analysts, and media and communication professionals who work with governments and international organizations to improve the ways in which overseas investments are targeted, monitored, and evaluated. Parks collaborated with a large team of experts to evaluate China’s development programs through rigorous evidence and presented the research results in a book titled, “Banking on Beijing: The Aims and Impacts of China’s Overseas Development Program. [2:02]: Methodology and Data Set [7:05]: Differences between China's and OECD Countries' International Development Finance [11:39]: Changes in Chinese Overseas Lending [15:11]: Impact on Recipient Countries' Economic Growth [21:33]: Objectives [29:11]: Reevaluating and Looking Ahead

China’s Global Development Initiative (GDI) was launched by President Xi Jinping on September 21, 2021. In a speech at the General Debate of the 76th Session of the UN General Assembly, Xi stated that, in the face of the severe shocks of the coronavirus pandemic, the world needed to work together to steer global development toward a new stage of balanced, coordinated, and inclusive growth. The GDI was meant to achieve those objectives as well as the United Nations' 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. A Group of Friends of the GDI was launched at the UN in January, and more than 55 countries have joined it to date. In today’s episode of China Global, Bonnie Glaser speaks with Dr. Yu Jie to discuss the GDI, which like most PRC initiatives, began as a bumper sticker and was described using vague and abstract language. Dr. Yu is a senior research fellow on China in the Asia-Pacific Program at Chatham House in London.

Lithuania-China relations is an interesting case study for how Beijing deals with small states and how it applies economic pressure on target countries to change policies that it views as damaging to Chinese interests. Tensions in Lithuania-China relations arise from numerous sources, including the decision by Vilnius to withdraw from the 17+1 mechanism between China and Central and Eastern European countries and its agreement to allow Taiwan to establish a representative office in Vilnius under the name Taiwanese Representative Office. In today’s episode of China Global, Bonnie Glaser speaks with Ambassador Diana Mickevičienė to discuss the drivers of the Lithuania-China friction as well as the circumstances surrounding her departure from China. Ambassador Mickevičienė currently serves as the Lithuanian ambassador to China, operating in exile from Vilnius.

On May 26, US Secretary of State Tony Blinken delivered a long-awaited speech on the Biden Administration’s approach to the People’s Republic of China. Separate from the speech itself, there is a China strategy document that remains classified. Blinken’s speech, which did not contain any surprises, introduced a new catchphrase for the Biden administration’s strategy toward China, the only country “with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to do it.” This catchphrase, “invest, align, and compete,” has three key features: invest in American strength at home, align with our network of allies and partners, and rely on these two key assets to compete with China to defend our interests and build our vision for the future. In today’s episode of China Global, Dr. Evan Medeiros joins Bonnie Glaser to discuss the Biden Administration’s strategy toward China. Dr. Medeiros is the Penner Family Chair in Asia Studies in the School of Foreign Service and the Cling Family Distinguished Fellow in U.S.-China Studies at Georgetown University. He previously served in the Obama administration, where he served on the staff of the National Security Council as Director for China, Taiwan, and Mongolia, and then as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Asia.

South Korea’s President Yoon Suk-yeol formally began his five-year term on May 10, 2022. His predecessor, former president Moon Jae-in, attempted to strike a balance between ties with China and the United States during his term, but whether he was able to successfully advance South Korean interests is unclear. Concurrently, public attitude in South Korea toward China has continued to harden, as Yoon pledged to prioritize the country’s alliance with the United States. China’s relationship with North Korea also seemed to become more distant due in part to the pandemic, but despite this, Beijing has not criticized North Korea’s missile tests—it has only generally urged all parties to exercise restraint. To discuss China’s policy toward and relations with both North and South Korea, Bonnie Glaser speaks with Dr. Seong-hyon Lee, a visiting scholar at Harvard University’s Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies and a fellow at the George H.W. Bush Foundation for US-China Relations.

On April 19, the PRC signed an agreement with the Solomon Islands that has prompted concerns in the United States, New Zealand, and Australia about growing Chinese influence that some worry could lead to a Chinese military presence in the Solomons. The Pacific Islands countries are scattered over a broad expanse of ocean and are widely seen as strategically significant. Yet, the region only receives episodic attention from the United States and other leading countries. Beijing has stepped up its engagement in the region, and there is a pressing need to understand the nature of that engagement and its implications. In this episode, Bonnie Glaser speaks with Professor Anne-Marie Brady, professor at the University of Canterbury in New Zealand on China’s interests, activities, and role in the Pacific Islands as well as the recent deal between China and the Solomon Islands. Among other issues, Professor Brady is a specialist in Chinese politics and China-Pacific relations, and her groundbreaking work on Chinese interference in New Zealand and other countries is globally renowned.

In this episode, Bonnie Glaser hosts Singapore’s Ambassador Bilahari Kausikan to discuss several international trends and their strategic significances. They discuss the implications of the war in Ukraine for the global order, particularly the Indo-Pacific, the consequences of growing strategic alignment between China and Russia, the possible endgame of the US-China strategic competition, and Southeast Asia’s future. Ambassador Kausikan is a former Ambassador-at-Large in Singapore’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Prior to this role, he served as the Second Permanent Secretary and then Permanent Secretary of the Foreign Ministry. He has held a variety of appointments during his career, including as Singapore's Permanent Representative to the United Nations in New York and as Ambassador to the Russian Federation. Currently, Ambassador Kausikan serves as Chairman of the Middle East Institute, an institute affiliated with the National University of Singapore.

Europe’s relations with China have been on a downward trajectory the past few years. The list for this decline is long: Europe’s concerns about human rights violations in Xinjiang, Chinese sanctions on EU parliamentarians, European uneasiness about PRC plans to dominate key strategic technologies, Chinese rebuff to international law in the South China Sea and its military pressure on Taiwan. Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine and the resulting civilian causalities further strained relations between China and the EU as Beijing abstained in the UN Security Council and the UN General Assembly and blamed the conflict on the five waves of NATO expansion. On April 1, the 23rd EU-China summit took place via video conference. President of the European Council, Charles Michel, and President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, accompanied by High Representative Josep Borrell, met with Chinese Prime Minister Li Keqiang in the morning and Chinese President Xi Jinping in the afternoon. Borell later described the meeting as a dialogue of the deaf—the Chinese side had little interest in talking about the war in Ukraine, preferring to discuss shared EU and Chinese interests. In an effort to drive a wedge between the US and the EU, Xi also called on the EU to form its own perception of China and adopt an independent China policy. In this episode, Bonnie Glaser speaks with Janka Oertel, Director of the Asia Program at the European Council on Foreign Relations to further discuss the April 1 EU-China summit and analyze the overall EU-China relationship.

On March 25, China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi visited India and met with India’s Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar and National Security Adviser Ajit Doval, marking the first high-level visit by a Chinese official to India since the 2020 Galwan Valley incident in which both Chinese and Indian soldiers were killed. Since the 2020 incident, both militaries have ramped up troops, weapons deployments, and infrastructure in the disputed region. Arranged at the initiative of Beijing, Wang Yi’s visit took place against the background of the ongoing war in Ukraine, in which both China and India have adopted stances on Russia’s invasion that are at odds with those of the United States, Europe, and some countries in Asia. To discuss Wang Yi’s meetings in India and the trajectory of the bilateral China-India relationship, Bonnie Glaser will speak with Dr. Tanvi Madan, senior fellow in the Project on International Order and Strategy and director of The India Project at Brookings Institution. She is author of the book “Fateful Triangle: How China Shaped US-India Relations during the Cold War.”

On the orders of Russia’s President Vladimir Putin, the Russians invaded Ukraine just after the close of the 2022 Winter Olympics in Beijing and a few weeks after Putin and Xi Jinping inked a sweeping joint statement that challenged the United States as a global power, opposed NATO enlargement, and condemned liberal democracy as a model for the world. To investigate China’s stance on the conflict and to better understand the interests that Beijing is trying to protect and advance in the Ukraine crisis, Bonnie Glaser will speak with Dr. Evan Feigenbaum, vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, where he oversees research in Washington, Beijing, and New Delhi. Dr Feigenbaum previously held several roles in the State Department in the George W. Bush administration.

In 2014, Xi Jinping declared his intention to make China into a polar great power. Four years later, Beijing outlined its vision for Arctic development in a white paper on the Arctic, which declared China’s role as a near-Arctic state. As part of its global Belt and Road Initiative, China is stepping up its activity in the Arctic—setting up research stations, investing in mining and energy, and working with Russia to create a new sea route through the Arctic Ocean. Amid rising tensions between China and the West, the trajectory of China’s Arctic agenda will likely become ever more salient to the future of trade, sustainable development, and international security.   To discuss China’s role, ambitions, and strategy in the Arctic, Bonnie Glaser speaks with Dr. Elizabeth Buchanan, a leading polar geopolitics expert. Dr. Buchanan is Lecturer of Strategic Studies with Deakin University and the inaugural Co-Director of the Modern War Institute’s Polar Security Research Initiative. Her forthcoming book is titled, “Red Arctic: Russian Strategy Under Putin.”

The post-World War II international system was created primarily by liberal democracies committed to the rule of law, free markets, and universal human rights. They launched multilateral institutions to advance their shared values and norms. China has long said that it views the international system as unjust and unfair, but for a long time, it had little ability to change it. Today, China not only has the means, but its leader Xi Jinping—who is likely to get a third five-year term in power this fall at the 20th National Party Congress—may also have a vision for a radically altered international system. A new book called The World According to China makes the case for this proposition. Bonnie Glaser speaks with the book’s author, Dr. Elizabeth Economy, on China’s approach to the international system. Dr. Economy is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University. She is currently on leave and is serving as senior advisor for China to the Secretary of Commerce. Views expressed are her own.

The Beijing Olympics will be held next month, and China faces both the challenge of Covid-19 spreading to several Chinese cities and growing criticism of its policy in Xinjiang, which has led some countries—including the United States—to declare diplomatic boycotts. Taking place in March, the National People’s Congress will have important implications for China’s economic policy, among other issues. Personnel rotations around the country are already beginning to take place and will continue throughout the year, as the Chinese Communist Party prepares for the all-important National Party Congress slated for the fall. Apart from bestowing a third five-year term in power to Xi Jinping, what else should we expect from the upcoming Party Congress? Jude Blanchette speaks with Bonnie Glaser on the key developments of 2022. He holds the Freeman Chair in China Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. His first book is China’s New Red Guards: The Return of Radicalism and the Rebirth of Mao Zedong.

China’s engagement with countries in Latin America and the Caribbean has grown significantly in the past decade. The Chinese government describes its cooperation with the region as focused on numerous areas: trade and investment, agriculture, energy, infrastructure, manufacturing, and technological innovation. Nineteen governments across Latin America and the Caribbean have joined Xi Jinping’s signature Belt and Road Initiative. Competition between China and Taiwan in the region remains fierce, with eight countries maintaining diplomatic relations with Taipei and the remaining 25 recognizing Beijing. Nicaragua was the latest to switch recognition to the PRC on December 9, 2021. US concerns about Chinese activities and objectives in the region are on the rise. In the final year of the Trump administration, the United States issued a strategic framework for the Western hemisphere, which included among its priorities countering economic aggression and malign political influence from external actors such as China. The 2021 Posture Statement of the US Southern Command warns that China is “seeking to establish global logistics and basing infrastructure in our hemisphere.” Dr. Evan Ellis joins Bonnie Glaser to discuss Chinese intentions, influence, and impact in Latin America and the Caribbean. He is a research professor of Latin American Studies at the US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute and previously served in the State Department on the Policy Planning Staff.

Next February, the 2022 Winter Olympics are scheduled to be held in Beijing, the venue of the 2008 Summer Olympics. Preparation for the Games is well underway and China has said that it looks forward to welcoming the athletes; but due to the coronavirus pandemic, Beijing has banned foreign spectators, as did Japan when it hosted the 2020 Summer Olympics. As the 2022 Olympics near, several countries, including the United States, Australia, the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Canada, and Lithuania, have announced a diplomatic boycott of the competition, and others may do so as well. So far, all countries will allow their athletes to compete. The diplomatic boycotts are a response to concerns about China’s human rights practices, especially in Xinjiang, where at least one million Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities have been subject to involuntary detention in what China labels “reeducation camps.” Countries have very limited leverage over Chinese domestic human rights practices, and some argue that the Olympics provides a rare opportunity to voice the international community’s concerns in a way that could shine a spotlight on China’s human rights violations. In an August 2021 survey, just under half of Americans stated that they believe China’s human rights record should prevent it from hosting the 2022 Winter Olympics, while 33 percent were uncertain. Please note that this podcast was recorded just prior to the Biden administration’s announcement that it would not send officials to the Olympic Games. Bonnie Glaser talks with Susan Brownell about the upcoming Olympics and, more broadly, about the role of sports in China and what the Olympics means to the Chinese people and to the Chinese Communist Party. Dr. Susan Brownell is a professor of anthropology at the University of Missouri-St. Louis. She was a Fulbright Senior Researcher at Beijing Sport University and competed on the Chinese track and field team at the Chinese National College Games in 1986. She is also the author of Training the Body for China: Sports in the Moral Order of the People’s Republic.

The U.S.-China relationship is in unchartered waters. The bilateral frameworks and mechanisms that existed in the past are now widely seen as inadequate to address the current complex and contentious relationship. The Biden administration put forth a three-pronged approach to the bilateral relationship: being competitive when it should be, collaborative when it can be, and adversarial when it must be. The Chinese side emphasizes principles to guide the relationship, including mutual respect, peaceful coexistence, and win-win cooperation. Against this background, the two countries’ leaders, Joe Biden and Xi Jinping, held their first virtual meeting on November 16. They had previously held two phone calls since Biden’s inauguration. This meeting was intended to enable a comprehensive strategic discussion about how to manage the differences between the United States and China and how to proceed with cooperation where the interests of the two countries align. Presidents Biden and Xi talked for 3.5 hours. To discuss this meeting and its implications for the U.S.-China relationship, Dr. Da Wei joins Bonnie Glaser. Da Wei is a professor of international relations at Tsinghua University and a senior research fellow at Tsinghua’s Center for International Security and Strategy. He has worked in China’s think tank and university communities for more than two decades and is among China’s top experts on the United States and U.S.-China relations.

Nearly six decades ago, China became the world’s fifth nuclear weapons state, joining the United States, France, the U.K., and the Soviet Union. China’s nuclear warheads stockpile was estimated last year to be in the low 200s. By comparison, the U.S. stockpile of nuclear warheads was at 3,750 as of September 2020. But recent developments suggest that Beijing is now engaged in a significant expansion of its nuclear arsenal, and maybe modifying its nuclear strategy as well. In the past few months, there have been reports of the construction of new missile silo fields and tests of a nuclear-capable hypersonic missile that could potentially evade U.S. missile defense systems. The Pentagon now predicts that China could quadruple its stockpile of nuclear warheads by 2030. What is motivating China’s nuclear force expansion? And what should the United States do to respond to China’s nuclear build-up? Dr. Fiona Cunningham joins Bonnie Glaser to discuss China’s evolving nuclear forces, its strategy, and how the United States might engage with China to mitigate the risk of conflict. Dr. Cunningham is an assistant professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania and has published research on China’s nuclear strategy, U.S.-China strategic stability, and escalation dynamics in the nuclear domain.

After the Trump administration pulled out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership in 2017, the trade agreement’s future was uncertain. Fortunately, Japan grabbed the baton and took it across the finish line in a slightly revised form and renamed the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). The agreement was signed in 2018 by the remaining 11 countries in the Indo-Pacific and the Americas, accounting for 13 percent of world GDP. The CPTPP’s high degree of market access—alongside other digital, labor, and environmental provisions—has earned it the reputation as “one of the broadest and most state-of-the-art trade agreements ever signed.” On September 16, 2021, China formally applied to join the CPTPP after nearly a year of hinting at its interest in membership. Observers still have many questions about its eligibility to meet the CPTPP’s high standards and there is an ongoing debate about whether and under what terms it should be included. Many also wonder when—or even if—the United States will consider rejoining the agreement. Bonnie Glaser speaks with Wendy Cutler about China’s bid to join the CPTPP. Wendy Cutler is vice president and managing director of the Washington D.C. office at the Asia Society Policy Institute. Wendy previously worked at the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative for nearly three decades, most recently serving as the acting deputy U.S. trade representative.

In 1990, China’s greenhouse gas emissions were less than a quarter of developing country emissions. In 2019, almost 3 decades later, China’s annual emissions exceeded those of all developed countries combined. In per capita terms, however, China’s carbon emissions are considerably less than the US and other developed countries. China is under growing global pressure to take steps to reduce its emissions. Last year at the UN General Assembly, Xi Jinping pledged “to peak [China’s] carbon dioxide emissions before 2030 and achieve carbon neutrality before 2060.” At this year’s UNGA meeting, Xi said China would “not build new coal-fired power projects abroad.” On October 31st the 26th UN Climate Change Conference of the Parties, or COP26, will be held in Glasgow, Scotland. Will Xi Jinping make additional pledges? How should we evaluate China’s commitments so far, and why does Beijing seek to be a global leader on climate change? Bonnie Glaser speaks with Dr. Joanna Lewis about China’s prospects at COP26 and the country’s broader climate agenda. Dr. Joanna Lewis is an Associate Professor and Director of the Science, Technology, and International Affairs Program at Georgetown University’s Walsh School of Foreign Service.

In a decades-long effort to expand its international “circle of friends,” the PRC has persisted in supplementing its national-level diplomacy with local exchanges. Over the past four decades, the PRC has forged more than 2000 sister-city relationships worldwide, including over 200 in the United States and over 350 in the EU. China forms these ties across the world through the Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries, a United Front organization that specializes in developing relationships with local business, political, and media figures abroad. But sister cities are only one of many avenues for Beijing to engage with local actors in order to realize its global aspirations. Bonnie Glaser talks with Dr. Mareike Ohlberg about China’s strategy of local diplomacy and its importance in an environment of increasingly tense national-level relations. Dr. Mareike Ohlberg is a senior fellow with GMF’s Asia Program. Her research interests include China’s media and digital policies as well as the Chinese Communist Party’s influence campaigns in Europe. Mareike is co-author of the book Hidden Hand: Exposing How the Chinese Communist Party is Reshaping the World.

Eight years since the introduction of the Belt and Road Initiative, President Xi Jinping’s hallmark foreign policy has gone global, making significant inroads into the developing world. Of the 140 bilateral BRI MoU’s signed between the People’s Republic of China and its partners, 85 of them have been with countries in Latin America, the Caribbean, Sub-Saharan Africa, South and Southeast Asia, and the Pacific. In some ways, the BRI formalizes the PRC’s pre-existing trade and investment practices in these regions. However, the initiative also reflects a more ambitious phase in Beijing's economic strategy in the developing world. And to date, the United States and its allies are still in search of an effective multilateral response. Can alternative economic initiatives like the Blue Dot Initiative and the G7’s recently introduced Build Back Better World (B3W) compete with the BRI in developing nations? Bonnie Glaser talks with Matt Ferchen about China’s economic strategy in the developing world. Dr. Matt Ferchen is the Head of Global China Research at the Mercator Institute for China Studies in Berlin. His research interests include Chinese economic statecraft, the Belt and Road Initiative in developing nations, and U.S.-China relations.

Ties between Moscow and Beijing continue their upward trajectory, with their bilateral cooperation expanding across a broad range of areas. In the wake of the withdrawal of US and NATO forces from Afghanistan, Russia and China are coordinating their policies. This past June, NATO expressed concern about Chinese-Russian military cooperation and their joint exercises in the Euro-Atlantic area. While the United States and virtually all its allies are criticizing numerous Chinese policies, Russian President Vladimir Putin told Xi Jinping in a phone call a few weeks ago that he supports China’s legitimate actions to safeguard its interests on issues related to Taiwan, Hong Kong, Xinjiang and the South China Sea, and said he opposes any external interference in China’s domestic affairs. Bonnie Glaser talks with Alexander Gabuev about Sino-Russian relations and the reactions of and the implications for the United States and Europe. Alexander Gabuev is a senior fellow and the chair of the Russia in the Asia-Pacific Program at the Carnegie Moscow Center. His research is focused on Russia’s policy toward East and Southeast Asia, political and ideological trends in China, and China’s relations with its neighbors—especially those in Central Asia.

In 2014, Xi Jinping established the China National Security Commission (CNSC) and was appointed its head by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Politburo. A year later, Xi stated that China “should attach equal importance to internal and external security.” Under his direction, the CCP has created a unified national security system based on Xi’s concept of comprehensive national security. That concept has evolved to include at least 16 forms of security, including military, territorial, technological, ecological, societal, polar, cyber, space, cultural, political, economic, bio, deep sea, resource, nuclear, and overseas interests. It is no exaggeration to say that national security tops Xi Jinping’s agenda. Bonnie Glaser talks with Dr. Sheena Chestnut Greitens about China’s concept of national security under Xi Jinping and the linkages between domestic security trends and Chinese foreign policy. Dr. Greitens is an Associate Professor of Political Science at the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas, Austin. Her research interests include East Asia, American national security, and authoritarian politics and foreign policy.

On August 10th, the People’s Republic of China recalled its ambassador to Lithuania and demanded Vilnius recall its representative to Beijing. The reason? Lithuania’s decision to allow Taipei to open a representative office in Vilnius under the name "Taiwanese Representative Office." Sino-Lithuanian relations started deteriorating in 2019. That year, Vilnius identified Chinese espionage as a threat to its national security. Since then, Lithuania has opposed the Hong Kong National Security Law at the UN Human Rights Council, withdrawn from the China-led 17+1 grouping, and criticized PRC policies in Xinjiang. In the meantime, Vilnius’ ties with Taiwan are warming. The new coalition government in Vilnius announced in November 2020 that it would follow a values-based foreign policy. Leaders pledged to “oppose any violation of human rights and democratic freedoms…from Belarus to Taiwan.” In addition to Taiwan’s plans to open a diplomatic mission in Vilnius, Lithuania will open its own trade office in Taipei this fall. Bonnie Glaser talks with Dr. Konstantinas Andrijauskas about the drivers of Lithuania’s recent policy shifts, Chinese interests in the region, and the potential for future Lithuania-Taiwan cooperation. Dr. Andrijauskas is an Associate Professor of International Relations at Vilnius University’s Institute of International Relations and Political Science. His research focuses on China’s domestic and foreign policies and the political systems and international relations of Asia.

After two decades of military involvement in Afghanistan, the United States and NATO are withdrawing their forces, with potential implications for regional security and thus for Chinese interests. Some observers have suggested the U.S. withdrawal will create opportunities for China to fill the void, but in fact, Beijing is worried about the potential negative security and economic impact of the U.S. pull-out. China has several major investments in Afghanistan, including in the Aynak Copper Mine and in the Amu Darya Basin Oil Fields. The Taliban has said it would welcome Chinese investments and reconstruction, but the Taliban’s rapidly growing influence has alarmed the Chinese government. An explosion that killed nine Chinese workers in Pakistan in mid-July, which Beijing has said was a terrorist attack, has further heightened Chinese fears of regional instability. Bonnie Glaser talks with Andrew Small about China’s interests, strategy, and future role in Afghanistan on this episode of China Global. Andrew is a senior transatlantic fellow with GMF’s Asia Program and author of The China-Pakistan Axis: Asia’s New Geopolitics. His research focuses on U.S.-China relations, Europe-China relations, Chinese policy in South Asia, and broader developments in China's foreign and economic policy.

Chinese companies are investing in ports that are strategically located along sea lanes of communication, connecting China to resources and markets that are vital for China’s economy. These ports, called “strategic strongpoints” by Chinese military writers, can be found all over the world—in Europe, the Americas, and countries situated adjacent to the South China Sea, the Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf, and the Horn of Africa. A growing number of observers believe that these commercial ventures will eventually become dual-use facilities or even military bases that will enable the Chinese navy to project power further from its shores. In this episode of China Global, Bonnie speaks with Dr. Isaac Kardon to discuss China’s growing role in port construction and operation and its potential strategic implications. Dr. Kardon is an assistant professor in the Strategic and Operational Research Department in the China Maritime Studies Institute at the US Naval War College. He specializes in China’s maritime disputes, Indo-Pacific maritime security and commerce, and Chinese firms’ overseas port projects.

A few months ago, China became the second country to successfully land on Mars. Since then, its Zhurong rover has sent back captivating panoramic images of the red planet. Meanwhile, China is building its own space station, which will rival the International Space Station (which Beijing was barred from in 2011) once completed next year. Last month, three Chinese astronauts arrived at the Tiangong station for a three-month stint; and just this weekend, the astronauts performed the country’s first tandem spacewalk. China’s ambitions don’t just reach beyond its borders – they reach far beyond this planet. In this episode of China Global, Bonnie sits down with Dr. Namrata Goswami to explore Beijing’s activities and ambitions in outer space, its cooperation in this domain with Russia and Europe, and the absence of collaboration with the U.S. Dr. Goswami is an author, strategic analyst, and consultant who focuses on great power competition and security in space. She is currently working on two book projects on space power and China’s grand strategy.

Earlier this year, China and Iran signed a 25-year strategic cooperation agreement outlining plans for economic, political, and security cooperation. On paper, the agreement appears ambitious. Some experts warn that it signals closer ties between Beijing and Tehran at the expense of the United States and its partners. But others caution that this should not be read as a major shift in China’s overall approach to Iran or the Middle East--noting that obtaining technology from Israel and oil from Saudi Arabia is too important for Beijing. As the two countries mark fifty years of relations, Bonnie is joined by Dr. William Figueroa to dive deeper into the history of Sino-Iranian ties, what each side wants out of their bilateral relationship, and what this quarter-century agreement really means for the balance of power in the Middle East and the rest of the world. Dr. Figueroa is an expert on the China in the Middle East, and holds a Ph.D. in history from the University of Pennsylvania where he wrote his dissertation on the history of Sino-Iranian relations from the early 1900s to the foundation of the Islamic Republic.

As the pandemic spread last year, the provision of life-saving supplies – PPE, ventilators, medicines, and eventually, vaccines -- quickly became intensely political. Pandemic response became not only a matter of life and death, but also of global reputation and influence. For China and Russia in particular, the distribution of supplies became a new front for flexing soft power. As early as April 2020, Xi Jinping made his plans known to treat China’s vaccines as global goods. And observers speculate that Beijing is using good will to mask a bigger geopolitical play: to press its interests on controversial issues like Taiwan and Huawei in exchange for desperately needed relief. What are China’s tactics and goals, and how have they evolved over the course of the pandemic? Will vaccine efficacy affect China’s ability to maneuver? Has Beijing had much luck in providing vaccines in exchange for political favors? Today on China Global, Bonnie Glaser digs deep into Beijing’s approach to vaccine diplomacy with Ivana Karásková, founder of MapInfluenCE and the organization China Observers in Central and Eastern Europe

As each other’s biggest trading partners, China and the European Union have typically viewed one another as collaborators on global challenges. But in recent months, China’s relationship with Europe has become more contentious than ever before. Just a few months after agreeing on a new Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI), the EU and Beijing traded sanctions and pointed statements. And just last week, the European Parliament voted to freeze ratification of the deal altogether, pressing China to lift its sanctions first. Meanwhile, friction is growing over Chinese policies in Hong Kong and in the South China Sea. There are reams of analysis on Europe’s evolving views of China, but much less on China’s own perspectives on Europe. In the inaugural episode of China Global, Bonnie Glaser is joined by Professor Lanxin Xiang to discuss Europe through China’s eyes, and where the relationship could be headed. Xiang is the Professor of International History and Politics at the Graduate Institute in Geneva, and he directs the Center of One Belt and One Road Studies at the China National Institute for SCO International Exchange and Judicial Cooperation.

China’s rise has captivated and vexed the international community. From defense, technology, and the environment, to trade, academia, and human rights, much of what Beijing does now reverberates across the map. China Global is a new podcast from the German Marshall Fund that decodes Beijing’s global ambitions as they unfold. Every other week, host Bonnie Glaser will be joined by a different international expert for an illuminating discussion on a different aspect of China’s foreign policy, the worldview that drives its actions, the tactics it’s using to achieve its goals—and what that means for the rest of the world.