The Science of Politics

In this live episode of The Science of Politics, panelists examined the class, race, and gender dynamics that shaped the 2024 election. The panel features Tom Edsall, Amanda Iovino, Patrick Ruffini, and Ruy Teixeira. Did the election cement a class realignment of American politics? Did Republicans peel off minority voters based on changing perceptions of the GOP as a working-class party? And how did these dynamics interact with the growing gender divide in voting?

Polls missed the 2016 election outcome and did even worse in 2020 on the margin, underestimating Donald Trump again. Should we believe the polls this time? What have pollsters changed? Have they overcorrected? In an era of one percent response rates for phone surveys and opt-in Internet panels, should we even talk about them in the same way? Michael Bailey finds that our theories about random sampling don’t really apply anymore. And weighting with larger samples does not solve our non-response biases. Brian Schaffner finds that weighting on several factors has increased, likely helping pollsters avoid undercounting Trump supporters. They both say survey research is important to get right but that the solutions are not obvious.

Pre-election polls show Black voters moving toward Donald Trump in 2024, even though he is now running against Kamala Harris. And Trump did gain a bit of margin among Black voters in 2020 compared to 2016, though he still loses nine out of ten. Should Democrats fear more attrition among Black voters this year or is it just a mirage from bad polling? Christopher Towler finds that Democrats made a lot of gains among Black voters this year by switching from Joe Biden to Kamala Harris. He says the gender divide may grow this year, but he thinks Black voters will come home to the Democrats. But Idan Franco finds that some Black voters support Trump because of their racial attitudes, not in spite of them. In other research, he finds similar trends among Hispanic voters, where immigration attitudes make some more likely to support Trump.

In the last 12 years, academic language about structural inequality made its way to media and popular discourse, leading to conservative critiques of “wokeness.” But how much really changed beneath the surface in our elite institutions? Musa Al-Gharbi finds that wokeness has peaked after it was the product of socio-economic trends in the professions. But he says it was mostly surface-level, visible in social norms that distracted from underlying economic realities.

Presidential campaigns narrow the battleground to an ever-smaller group of potentially pivotal states—where they spend most of their time and money in the race to 270 electoral votes. How do presidential campaigns envision and select their paths to victory? And how much do these decisions matter? Daron Shaw takes us inside the presidential campaigns from 1952 to 2020, with data and analysis from the campaigns themselves. He finds that calcified partisanship and campaign finance liberalization have moved us into a micro-targeted era, with a smaller group of mutually agreed battleground states. But resource allocation decisions can still make enough of a difference to tip the balance in several recent elections--and maybe 2024 as well.

College-educated voters are moving toward the Democrats, with the less educated moving toward the Republicans. Will 2024 continue the pattern or reverse the trend? What will that mean for the culture war that has engulfed the nation and refocused the political parties? David Hopkins breaks down the consequences of the diploma divide, from woke business to the COVID wars. This is not just about polarized sides moving apart: it’s about the victory of educated liberals in the culture war and the backlash that has evened party competition while transforming the Democrats.

After years of signs that the American parties were institutionally weak and vulnerable to takeover, Democratic Party elites coalesced to quickly replace their presidential candidate. But a longer historical sweep suggests it will not be a quick return to parties’ traditional roles. Daniel Schlozman and Sam Rosenfeld find that Democrats and Republicans have become hollow shells, unrooted in civic organizations, with Republicans captured by extremism and Democrats ineffectual. Their weaknesses, they say, are the source of our political discontent.

Vice President Kamala Harris has replaced Joe Biden as the Democratic nominee. And the conversation has immediately turned to race and gender. What do we know about how Black and Asian women candidates are treated by parties and voters? How does the Harris experience compare to others running for office? What does it mean for her ability to win in November and inspire a new generation of more diverse leaders? Jamil Scott has researched the unique features of Black women candidacies, from the decision to run to raising money to adapting to stereotypes. And she has also studied the increasing racialization of American elections. She tells me the typical tropes and conversations came immediately to this campaign.

In the midst of a harrowing political campaign, can Americans tone down their partisanship and unify around their common American values? Matthew Levendusky finds that Americans misperceive those in the other party and can improve their views if they are reminded of our shared national identity. From the Olympics to the 4th of July, some moments remind us that we have more in common than we may think. But reduced animosity also requires knowing real people on the other side of our divides and building cross-partisan friendships.

Democrats and Republicans rely on partisan think tanks for policy proposals, along with the numbers and findings that justify them. How did think tank research reach a central place in our politics and how influential are they? E. J. Fagan finds that partisan think tanks like the Heritage Foundation helped polarize the congressional issue agenda and debate, replacing the non-partisan expertise that Congress used to rely on. Conservative think tanks are gearing up for a possible second Trump administration while Biden’s policy agenda remains reliant on the liberal side of the think tank establishment.

The impact of racial attitudes in American politics isn’t just about the presence or absence of anti-Black prejudice. Some White Americans say they are highly sympathetic to the plight of Black Americans. Are they just placing Black Lives Matter signs in their yards or does it translate into political views and actions? Jennifer Chudy finds that many White Americans, especially liberal Democrats, have sympathy that translates into support for redistributive social welfare policies and opposition to punitive criminal justice policies. There is a growing and important left side of Americans' racial views.

We have overestimated the influence of partisan misinformation during political campaigns. But that doesn't mean we're well-informed. Americans know little about important public policy issues and they "know" things that aren’t so. Emily Thorson finds that Americans concoct information about current policy to match what they think they know. It's not that they are fed misinformation but that the media report little about the details of current policy, leaving voters to make up the facts. Correcting this misinformation about existing policy can make a difference and help Americans evaluate new proposals for policy change.

Robert F. Kennedy Jr is polling higher than prior third party candidates and his supporters could make the difference in a close election. Americans say they want a third party, but is this what they had in mind? Jonathan Cervas finds that in 2020, third parties actually took more potential votes from Republicans than Democrats. Victor Wu finds that lots of Americans say they want a third party. But most partisans seeking third options clearly favor their side’s issue positions. There’s not much of a constituency for a grand unity ticket in the middle.

Despite popular resistance in each party, Congress just reached wide bipartisan agreement on military aid to Israel, Ukraine, and Taiwan along with a forced sale of TikTok. Even in a polarized age, Congress has managed bipartisan votes on controversial issues in an election year. Jordan Tama finds that bipartisan coalitions are quite common in congressional consideration of foreign policy—from overlapping competing alliances to broad support for internationalism, Congress is far less polarized on foreign policy than domestic policy. William Bendix finds that legislators are consistent in how they sponsor foreign policy bills based on their ideological views even across administrations of different parties. He also finds that hawks usually lead and win congressional votes over doves, regardless of who is president.

Joe Biden is facing re-election shepherding an unsteady economy through high interest rates. Is this Democrats' bad economic luck repeating itself? Joe Stone finds that Democratic presidents have regularly expanded economies at the beginning of their terms but Republicans benefit from expanded economies leading up to the election. And partisan misalignment with the Federal Reserve also dampens economic performance. William Clark finds that the Fed raises interest rates as elections approach under Democratic presidents and lowers them for Republican presidents. And the Fed is more responsive to inflation under Democratic presidents. They both say the historical patterns may help explain why Biden finds himself in a more difficult position.

Our jobs shape our politics, including whether we run for office and which side of the political spectrum makes us feel most comfortable. Just as we are polarizing geographically, even our workplaces are now more likely to be filled with those who agree with us about politics. And our politicians come from these workplaces, often taking the specific concerns of their occupations with them. Max Kagan finds that you are most likely to encounter fellow partisans in your workplaces, partly because metro areas, occupations, and industries are politically homogeneous, and partly because we select into workplaces that share our politics. Jack Landry finds that state legislators bring their occupational concerns with them to legislating, shaping their committee assignments, campaign contributions, and personal financial interests. They both say it’s a complicated causal chain: we may segregate our work interests because of factors related to politics but we could also be socialized into the norms and interests of the places where we work.

Congress is fearful of TikTok’s influence, but America’s young people increasingly see it as a key platform for learning about and spreading political ideas. Will TikTok get young people engaged in the 2024 election or serve as another distraction? Neta Kligler-Vilenchik finds that young people embody an expressive citizenship, where you should speak out if you see injustice, and have found TikTok to be a fruitful platform. But she doubts that older politicians have figured out how to use it for effective persuasion. Richard Fox finds that TikTok users are liberal and more active, online and offline. But they take politics less seriously. He sees the same complaints about media change that scholars have been making for generations: we're favoring shorter, less substantive, and emotional clips over real learning. They both say we should be skeptical of TikTok remaking politics but that we should listen to young people, who see real change.

The opioid crisis has not abated, but so far policy has remained far less punitive than for prior drug epidemics. Is that because it has been characterized and seen as a “white” drug problem? Could it take a more punitive turn if its connotations change? Tanika Raychaudhuri finds that sympathetic media coverage makes Whites more supportive of treatment over punitive policies for Black and White users, but less so for Black users. Justin de Benedicts-Kessner finds that White and Black Americans are more sympathetic when they see opioid users who look like themselves. Users who got into opioids through prescribed drugs see the least blame.

We are headed toward a replay of 2020, with the oldest candidates ever nominated for president. How much does candidate age matter in elections and how do voters judge older and younger options? If voters are disappointed with older candidates, why do they keep electing a gerontocracy? Jennifer Wolak finds that voters do stereotype older and younger candidates but not to the disadvantage of older options. But she also finds that older members of Congress have lower approval ratings. Semra Sevi studied the 2020 Democratic presidential primary, finding that bringing age to voters' attention did not affect their electability assessments. But in other research, she finds that younger voters prefer younger candidates globally. They both say our older candidates are the product of the system, not the voters.

COVID brought expansions of social welfare programs and increased flexibility. But many of the changes expired. Now Congress is considering a bit of a revival of the child tax credit expansion, but recipients of traditional welfare programs won’t see equivalent gains. Did policymakers learn the right lessons from the successes and failures of COVID-era expansions? Carolyn Barnes finds that remote appointments helped recipients but that some program changes confused them. She says we’re back to a period of retrenchment but administrators are trying to adapt when they have incentives to do so. Mariely Lopez-Santana finds that support for the child tax credit expansion was not as high as for other programs because families were not perceived as that deserving. Even recipients were not converted to program advocates.

With the prospect of a second emboldened Trump administration on offer, the administrative state is under attack. How well did the bureaucracy deal with Trump appointees? Was there really a resistance in a "deep state"? And how much are career civil servants affected by chaos and turnover in the political class that sit above them? Jaime Kucinskas finds limited and ineffectual resistance of administrators under Trump, even among those alarmed by his actions, with employees still highly committed to the goals of their agencies. Amanda Rutherford finds that upper-level bureaucrats actually report higher satisfaction when they face political vacancies and they are less likely to want to leave. That suggests chaos at the top may not lead to wholesale degradation.

Are political elites in bubbles, out of touch with the American public, not recognizing how their views and conditions are not reflective of most people’s experience? Prior research found that elites tend to overestimate conservative policy positions in the American public, but there are wider misperceptions across the political spectrum. Alexander Furnas finds that unelected political elites—from government officials to lobbyists to media figures—all assume that public opinion more closely matches their own opinions than it really does. Adam Thal finds that politicians overestimate the level of financial struggles facing constituents. But correcting those misperceptions does not change their opinions.

After a year of minimal lawmaking, the public is disappointed with Congress. And the members don’t seem very happy either, but they are not changing their behavior. How much has Congress deteriorated and why? Alex Theodoridis has a new survey of former members of Congress to explore their insights on what ails Congress. We discuss January 6th and polarization and their favorite presidents and leaders from the past. The former Republicans seem to recognize their party’s plight and everyone sees dysfunction.

Voters are upset about disarray at the US-Mexico border and the increase in illegal crossings under President Biden. But they also reacted negatively to former president Trump’s crackdowns. In both ways, immigration has become more important in our politics, making it more like Europe. Ernesto Tiburcio finds that flows of unauthorized migrants into the US have moved Americans and local governments in a conservative political direction. Areas that have seen more unauthorized flows start voting more Republican and redirect expenditures away from services and toward enforcement. But the backlash may run both ways. In Europe, Alexander Kustov finds that radical-right party success has softened views of immigrants and immigration. But his work also finds that anti-immigration voters prioritize the issue more than those who favor immigration.

Despite relatively strong economic data, the public is sour, judging President Biden poorly and putting him even or below former President Trump in early polling. How will polls and economic assessments evolve as we approach the 2024 election? Robert Erikson finds that early polls are not predictive but that presidents will eventually be judged by their economic standing. He’s co-produced some of the most important scholarship on using polls to predict elections and understanding how citizens judge the president based on economic expectations.

Courts have overruled key policy changes from President Biden acting alone. But Republicans are gearing up to enact a suite of policy changes on Day 1 of a potential new administration, reigniting fears of an imperial presidency. Jon Rogowski finds that presidents act unilaterally quite often, beyond executive orders to include a lot of other tools, especially under divided government. But Dino Christenson finds that significant executive actions are scarce because the president can be constrained by Congress and the courts through the potential reaction of the American public.

Even with low approval, President Biden is still a big fundraising draw. In fact, presidents spend lots of time fundraising and the campaign is now year-round. And Biden has big competition: former President Trump never stopped fundraising or campaigning. Brendan Doherty finds that changes in campaign finance law have enabled a formidable presidential fundraising operation for the party as a whole. It’s a window into the president’s connection to their party and another sign that the divide between campaigning and governing has collapsed.

The United Auto Workers is gaining concessions and unions are generating public support with strikes this year. But Democrats have been losing voting share among union members and private industrial unions are still in decline. What dynamics gave rise to unions’ Democratic support and is a resurgence possible? Lainey Newman and Theda Skocpol investigate the political evolution of unions in Western Pennsylvania, a former heartland of Democratic union support. They find that union ties used to be an important part of working-class identities, social networks, and community life, guiding people toward Democratic support as part of a social consensus. But today, union members are more likely to socialize in gun clubs and less likely to retain Democratic ties and they see Democrats as socially distant and focused on cultural liberalism and college graduates.

Voters with college degrees are increasingly supporting Democrats, with Republicans now doing better among those without college—a big reversal in recent decades. Joshua Zingher finds that college-educated Americans are more liberal on social issues and that more educated Americans are moving furthest toward Democrats when surrounded by other educated people. White voters are flipping fastest by education but the trends are present across the electorate. Will Marble finds that white college graduates are now more liberal across economic, social, racial, and foreign policy issues. Less educated white voters have increased the importance they place on non-economic issues, polarizing the electorate on these issues.

Most people don’t know who their state legislators are, much less what they are up to. So how do voters hold them accountable to public views? Steven Rogers finds that voters don’t know enough about state politicians and most legislators are not facing competitive elections. Electoral mechanisms are not enough to keep them from diverging from the people they represent. But Chris Warshaw finds that state policy has grown more representative of state publics and more responsive to changes in opinion, only partly because elections change who is in power. State officials also follow public opinion in between elections and out of fear of electoral threat.

In the aftermath of the 2020 election, local election officials became objects of unfounded conspiracy theories and attacks. But local clerks, even those elected in partisan elections, do make and implement key decisions about voting opportunities and election procedures. Do they tip the scales to favor their party? Daniel Thompson finds that electing a Democrat vs. a Republican as a county clerk does not affect subsequent election results or turnout. Thompson says reasonable concerns about the partisan effects of election law changes often do not materialize in real advantages.

In 2016, Donald Trump dominated media coverage in the race for the Republican nomination and he is on track to do so again this time. Does the media react to events and signals of public support, moving from one candidate to the next, or does it just focus on the frontrunner? And is media attention the main moving part in presidential primary campaigns? Zachary Scott finds that the media only sequentially highlights candidates in some nomination contests. But Trump dominated coverage more than others, in part due to his fearful and personalized rhetoric. Kevin Reuning finds that public interest follows rather than brings media coverage. Media attention led to increased poll support for Trump in 2016, but not for the other candidates. At least in 2016, the conventional story that Trump garnered outsize coverage and benefited seems correct.

Do our social media feeds polarize us, with algorithms that lure us into echo chambers and trap us with viral political content and misinformation? Andy Guess is part of four new papers that suggest these claims are overblown. The big social science collaboration with Meta found that reducing exposure to content shared by those that agree with you politically does not change political attitudes. Neither does reducing reshared content or changing algorithmic feeds to reverse chronological feeds. Some conservative Facebook users are in a bubble, but we may not be able to blame the algorithm for our polarization.

The hottest July on record is bringing big headlines, with scientists and activists hoping that Americans will notice the changing climate and call for policy action. But the prior record suggests no easy path from climate impacts to mobilization for change. Peter Howe finds that the effects of temperature shocks and natural disasters on public opinion are limited and inconsistent. The effects tend to be on basic awareness and are not as strong as initially suspected. Sam Rowan of Concordia University finds that temperature shocks and natural disasters do not seem to generate climate policy reforms at any level of government worldwide. Climate policy is slowly moving forward but not in response to local extreme weather.

American business used to be a common partner of Republicans. But the party claims that corporations have now gone “woke”, endorsing progressive values. Are companies really moving leftward? Eitan Hersh finds that business leaders perceive their companies moving toward Democratic elites and policy priorities, mostly due to internal demands. Soubhik Barari finds that companies are moving leftward in their social media posts and that public messaging is indicative of their internal behavior. They both say the woke capitalism narrative may be incomplete, but commentators are reacting to real change.

The Supreme Court made major conservative rulings this term but did not go as far as some expected. Are Court rulings out of step with public opinion? How much do they risk public backlash for moving against the public? Joe Ura finds that the Court provokes more backlash for moving in a too liberal direction than a too conservative direction. Stephen Jessee finds that the Court has been moving rightward but that the public is slow to notice. They both doubt the Court will provoke nearly as much backlash this year as with their abortion opinion in Dobbs. Image credit: iStock

High levels of political violence and low levels of institutional support suggest we are in the midst of an age of discord. What can we learn from the cycles of history about political disintegration and recovery? Peter Turchin predicted the tumult. He points to our large class of aspiring elites competing for power without advancing the living standards of most Americans. The past suggests that our choices are either a mostly unchallenged elite who moderate how much of the economic pie they capture or a prolonged conflict over power among overproduced elites.

Before primary voters get input, local party leaders recruit and select candidates to run for office. Their views produce and limit voters' choices. Even if voters might support candidates from diverse occupations or ethnicities, those candidates might never run if party leaders tap someone else. Michael Miller finds that county party chairs have different preferences than primary voters and party activists. They are very concerned with local ties and fear that their voters won’t support Black or Latino candidates. They are critical to giving voters choices, even in places where partisan competition is weak, but their strategic discrimination constrains the candidate pool.

Why does the federal government budget under pressure in high-stakes showdowns like the debt ceiling deadline, especially when Republicans control Congress under Democratic presidents? And why do the imposed spending constraints not last? On this special edition, Matt Grossmann talks to Joshua Huder of Georgetown University for a deep dive into the context and history for the debt ceiling showdown. Rather than review the day-to-day dynamics of the current struggle, they review what has happened under previous standoffs and agreements, why Republicans take budgeting to the brink, and the legacy of the Budget Control Act from the last time they won.

Government administrators often write complex and interacting rules that make it harder to access public programs to improve health and social welfare. They impose compliance, learning, and psychological costs on the people that these programs are trying to help. Donald Moynihan and Pamela Herd have launched a renewed recognition of the barriers that program beneficiaries face and documented how many burdens are knowingly implemented to undermine government success.

Republicans and Democrats dislike and misunderstand each other and anti-democratic attitudes are on the rise. But some strategies are effective for reducing polarization and animosity. Robb Willer tested 25 short interventions like videos and informational messages from across the scholarly and practitioner community, finding that many reduced partisan animosity and some reduced support for antidemocratic practices. The effects lasted and provided some ideas for real-world tactics to tackle polarization. The results offer some good news for a change.

Donald Trump is facing numerous legal challenges for misconduct, but it does not appear to be hurting him with Republican voters. Members of Congress like George Santos are also brushing off mounting scandals, using them to raise money. Have candidates grown immune from scandal, even one after another? Brian Hamel finds that scandals traditionally hurt incumbents with voters but helped them with donors. But the rise of nationalized polarized campaigns has meant they no longer hurt at the ballot box. Mandi Bates Bailey finds that scandals can hurt candidates with voters, but multiple scandals don’t hurt them any more than one scandal. Voters can only process so much that they hear about a candidate and only some voters will prioritize that information over partisanship.

Black voters saved Joe Biden in the 2020 Democratic primary. They are the firm base of the Democratic coalition, despite a diversity of backgrounds and opinions, but some have shown signs of openness to Donald Trump. How do Black voters select candidates? And when and why do they prioritize descriptive representation? Julian Wamble finds that Black voters seek strong signals that politicians will prioritize the group’s interest over their personal interest, particularly from historic sacrifice. We discuss his research on how candidates can demonstrate social ties, political connections, and personal sacrifice to Black voters and whether those strategies trade off with candidate appeals to white voters.

Republican governors like Ron DeSantis have elevated critiques about racial and gender politics in schools and universities to the center of American politics, quickly transforming both K-12 and higher education policy debates. What are schools and universities actually doing and why have critiques of critical race theory and educators gained such political power now. Carson Byrd finds that universities are not achieving racial equality but have still become the place for conservatives to react against cultural change. Jonathan Collins finds that critical race theory has become an effective bogeyman despite wide public support for teaching about racism in public schools. Both reflect on how these debates quickly became the center of our culture wars and merged K-12 and university politics.

As the U.S. diversifies, political representation is not keeping pace. But that doesn’t mean we can blame the voters. Black and Hispanic candidates do win elections when they run and generate support from their parties. In fact, it could be that apprehension about how voters would react is what is holding back political representation.  Eric Gonzalez Juenke finds that non-white candidates that barely win primary elections over white candidates do at least as well in general elections as white candidates who barely win—if not even better. Minority candidates can win, in either party and even in districts without large minority populations.

Democrats are dramatically shaking up the presidential nomination system, dislodging Iowa and New Hampshire to enshrine a new calendar. How much difference will this make? Does it portend a new reformed era, or will invisible primary coordination still rule before anyone starts voting? Josh Putnam is a practicing political scientist who watches the rules changes closer than anyone, finding a complicated dance between national parties, state parties, candidates, and state laws. He also understands how the rules fit into the dynamics that govern who wins nominations and who gains and loses power among party factions. For those gearing up for 2024, this is a must-listen conversation.

Congress is hiring more communications staff than ever, trying to influence the public debate and keep up with the social media conversation. Does their public communication match their policy agenda? Lindsey Cormack has tracked congressional emails for 14 years, while Annelise Russell has analyzed congressional tweets. They’ve found differences across parties and genders but say watching what legislators say online provides early clues to changes in their priorities and attitudes. Watching their language can help identify factions and provide a preview of the new Congress.

Do polarized politics leave anyone left in the middle? Anthony Fowler finds that most Americans’ political views fall between the opinions of Democratic and Republican elites. And that’s not because they don’t understand politics in the same way. Most Americans’ views fall into the ideological continuum from left to right; they’re just somewhere in the middle. These moderates matter for election outcomes. While they participate a bit less, they are the consequential swing voters. Fowler also finds that selecting candidates on policy grounds could matter more to voters than the power of partisan identity. We may not be giving voters enough credit.

President Biden’s first two years with a narrow Democratic Congress brought big ambitions and substantial new policy. As we now shift to a Republican House, how should we put Biden’s first two years in context? To help, Matt Grossmann talks with Casey Dominguez of the University of San Diego, who has wide ranging expertise on presidents, Congress, and the political parties. Her work has covered presidential honeymoons, judging presidents on their own terms, and how parties decide primary elections. She’s a big picture thinker about the state of each political party and the role of political science in understanding current events.

Elon Musk’s takeover of Twitter is producing a firestorm of controversy, especially among journalists, political professionals, and academics. But how did Twitter become the preferred platform for journalists to interact with politicos and professors, the key conduit for research and opinion to make their way to media coverage, and the center of elite discourse? This week, I talk to Shannon McGregor of the University of North Carolina, the key expert on the role of Twitter in political journalism and campaigning. She finds that journalists treat Twitter as content to be redeployed for narratives and exemplars of public opinion, even if it is not representative of the broader society. We talk about the role of Twitter on the Left and Right, the implication of Musk’s policy changes, and the reasons we all have such a love/hate relationship with the platform.

Democrats and Republicans are electing new leaders for their parties in the U.S. House and Senate, as a new era begins with the replacement of Speaker Nancy Pelosi. How much did Pelosi change Congress? How are new leaders likely to corral their factions and set a new tone? Matthew Green finds that many of the dynamics of party factions and leadership elections remain consistent, but there are novel situations, including the simultaneous transition of three top House Democratic leaders and demands for caucus rules changes in the Speaker election. We also evaluate this congress and anticipate divided government.

Many Americans are now voting before Election Day. Does early voting and voting by mail increase turnout or help one party? Does early voting data allow us to predict election results in advance? Michael McDonald says yes. He is the foremost tracker of early voting and turnout data. We review the results of the 2022 election and early voting in the last three elections and also discuss the new normal of high turnout and the effects of this redistricting cycle.

Democrats did far better than expected in the 2022 midterm election, especially in swing states and districts. Do the early results provide new data on the effects of campaign messaging and careful candidates? Can Democrats overcome structural disadvantages by campaigning on popular issues? David Shor argues that campaign effects, especially from moderate popular candidates, help explain the outcome, whereas appeals to turnout and changes in electoral composition do not. The conversation also covers what can and cannot be learned with immediate data and how to use both political science and practitioner data to understand the effects of campaign strategy.

People who are pro-choice on abortion also tend to be against the death penalty. But are those beliefs internally connected? Would changing one belief change the other? And do all of our views add up to a coherent belief system? Mark Brandt finds that beliefs that tend to go together in the society as a whole don’t necessarily map onto how we see them fitting together in our own heads. And the internal relationships between our ideas can be better used to predict the dynamics of opinion change. We do have coherent belief systems, but they may not match our societal divisions.

We seem to have become partisan animals, with Republican or Democratic identification now tied to all of our other social identities and political attitudes. In the height of the campaign season, Americans start to define ourselves based on our partisan side, changing our views to reinforce our identity. Emily West finds that partisan identity is heightened as Election Day approaches and can be made more or less salient in experiments. When partisan identity is brought to the top of the mind, Republicans become more racially resentful--matching their party norm. But induced partisan identity does not explain affective polarization. We don’t seem to hate each other because partisanship is part of our identity. So ideological considerations and other factors still matter for producing and sustaining opposition to the other party and our own partisan identity. It all tends to be self-reinforcing, but there are times and interactions that can dampen the cycle.

How Misperceptions and Online Norms Drive “Cancel Culture” by Niskanen Center

As voters are inundated with campaign advertising and news coverage, can they learn key information through all the noise? Joshua Kalla tests hundreds of messages on thousands of voters in the 2020 presidential election, finding that voters can be persuaded, especially with specific information about Biden. Kevin DeLuca finds that more high quality candidates, like those endorsed by newspapers, are still winning at high rates. Despite strong partisanship, voters do learn from campaigns and are willing to shift their votes in response to what they learn.

Public opinion polls often show large majorities in favor of hypothetical changes in public policy, such as universal background checks for gun purchases. But when voters have the opportunity to enact those changes in ballot measure initiative campaigns, the results are usually much closer. Jonathan Robinson finds that state public opinion is related to initiative voting results, but large majorities are substantially reduced. Part of the reason is status quo bias: the electoral context makes it clear that voters are being asked to change current law. Robinson is a political practitioner engaged in scholarship, who merges the perspectives of both worlds. As co-author of a major report on voter turnout and vote swings in 2020, he also looks ahead to 2022.

In the 2022 primary elections, many incumbent legislators have lost their seats to more extreme candidates, and Trump-endorsed newcomers are winning races against established professionals. Both are the culmination of ongoing trends. Rachel Porter finds that primary electorates, especially on the Republican side, are far more extreme than general electorates. And primary voters have increasingly been preferring amateur candidates over experienced politicians, partially because those candidates can now raise early national money. While that can mean more diversity in the candidate pool, it may also drive congressional dysfunction.

Federalism is supposed to allow policy to vary with local opinion and circumstances. But American politics has nationalized, with many seeing states as arenas for national political debates among partisan networks rather than opportunities for state-specific solutions. And states are even fighting about the basic ground rules of democracy. Jacob Grumbach finds that nationalization made state policy respond more to party control, with legislators responding to activist donors over public opinion, states copying electorally successful policies only from states controlled by the same party, & Republican states causing democratic backsliding.

The polls were off more than usual in the last presidential election and the polling industry is suffering from low response rates, mode changes, and unrepresentative samples. But G. Elliott Morris finds that polling has long been vital for democracy and has mostly been improving over time. Pollsters have always had to adapt to new challenges and are doing so again. Given the benefits for prediction and for the knowledge of scholars and political leaders, we have to get it as close to right as we can. That starts with acknowledging the difficulties and lowering our expectations for precision.

A diverse young generation is ready to change our politics and culture, but our congressional leadership and presidential options remain geriatric. It's not just the normal politics of aging: the baby boomer generation has maintained extraordinary power and influence throughout its life course. Kevin Munger finds that generational conflict is inevitable as the baby boomers retire but maintain their political influence against much more diverse, less religious, and more liberal rising generations. The institutions boomers built are losing credibility, but we should not expect their power to wane.

Did the Birchers win after all? by Niskanen Center

Declining response rates for polls mean we must rely on the shrinking minority of Americans that agree to be interviewed to represent the broader public. Josh Clinton finds that Democrats were more likely to agree to be interviewed than Republicans or Independents in 2020. Common corrections could not compensate, as the partisans who do respond aren’t representative of those who don’t. Amnon Cavari finds that the people who refuse to participate in polls are less educated and less interested in politics. This means our measures of polarization overestimate partisan differences by speaking only to the highly engaged. We rely on public opinion surveys, but small response biases can paint a misleading picture. Guests: Josh Clinton, Vanderbilt University; Amnon Cavari, Reichman University Studies: “Reluctant Republicans, Eager Democrats?” and “Survey Nonresponse and Mass Polarization.”

A leaked Supreme Court opinion suggests that Roe v. Wade may be overturned this summer, forthrightly moving abortion policymaking to the states. The states have played an important role in bringing about the decision, setting the stage for the fights to come. Now abortion bills are moving from symbolic politics to real consequences. Rebecca Kreitzer discusses her long work on abortion politics, including the role of women representatives, interest groups, and public opinion, helping us understand how we got here and prepare for what’s to come.

Women are underrepresented in American political institutions, despite the positive track record of women in office and the willingness of voters to support women candidates. Gender differences in political ambition originate in childhood and are difficult to counteract. Mirya Holman finds that girls tend to think of politicians as men and politics as a man’s world—and those perceptions build over time to reduce intended political involvement. In this conversational addition, Holman also talks about her experience as a leader in the field of gender and politics research and the efforts to achieve gender parity in research and practice.

American public policy includes a lot of economistic thinking. Policy analysts weigh costs and benefits, use economic projections and models, and try to calculate the value of almost everything. That may not have been inevitable. Elizabeth Popp Berman finds that a revolution in applied microeconomics brought about a shift in bureaucratic agencies, which led to self-reinforcing requests for more economics trainees and economistic ideas, with governments increasingly asking for a particular form of economic analysis that limited the scope of government action. This economic revolution explains how the Democratic Party moved rightward, foreclosing further left economic alternatives by changing the language and criteria for policymaking.

Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson seems likely to be confirmed for the Supreme Court, fulfilling President Biden's campaign promise to elevate the first Black woman to the Court. At her nomination hearings, Judge Jackson faced the usual reception colored by partisanship as well as her race and gender. What did we learn from those hearings? Katelyn Stauffer finds that previous nominations of Clarence Thomas, Elena Kagan, and Sonia Sotomayor helped soften opposition from ideological opponents among those who shared the nominee’s racial or gender identity. Jessica Schoenherr finds that senators use nomination hearings to represent their constituents, with different postures by same- and opposition-party senators depending on their control over the impending vote. We talk about whether Judge Jackson’s hearings were a charade and the role of descriptive representation in how political leaders and the Court are perceived.

Guest: Erica Frantz, Michigan State University Russia’s invasion of Ukraine shows how the incentives and views of dangerous leaders drive world events. The efficacy of the international community's response depends on how regimes like Russia's work. Erica Frantz finds that personalist regimes like Russia are more likely to initiate conflicts and suffer from misperceptions in a close inner circle. Putin’s actions follow authoritarian patterns elsewhere. This conversational edition features research and commentary on the war, the sanctions, the behavior of other regimes like China, the global implications of the rise in personalist authoritarianism, and the direction of research on harder-to-observe countries.

Guests: Adam Zelizer, the University of Chicago; Christian Fong, University of Michigan Studies: “Is Position Taking Contagious?”; “Expertise, Networks, and Interpersonal Influence in Congress.” Policymaking seems dominated by polarized views and misinformation. But what if legislators are willing to listen to and share expertise on policy issues? Adam Zelizer provides informative briefings to state legislators on pending bills and finds that they listen, increasing their co-sponsorship of those bills and bringing along their office mates, as information spreads from one lawmaker to the next. Christian Fong finds that when legislators are assigned to new committees in the middle of a term, the legislators they usually work with start voting with them more often on bills in that committee’s issue area. Lawmakers take cues from the most informed legislators. They may be doing the best they can with limited knowledge and a lot on their plate. Photo credit: iStock

Public opinion tends to move in the opposite direction of policy. But how does the public learn that policy is changing, enabling their adjustment? And does a polarized and inattentive public still react together in response to policy? Stuart Soroka and Christopher Wlezien, the key developers and testers of the thermostatic model, find that television and newspaper coverage provides a good signal of which way national policy is heading. And the public as a whole, not just the most informed or a shrinking middle, receive that signal and respond by adjusting their preferences--favoring more spending when it declines and less when it increases. The result is that they tend to think each side goes too far moving policy in their preferred ideological direction. That’s frustrating to policymakers, but it may represent democracy in action.

Advanced democracies are backsliding. Can we count on the public to save them? Democratic principles may be widely shared, but that does not mean citizens respond as we might hope. Christopher Claassen finds that publics around the world react against advances in liberal democracy by becoming less favorable toward democracy but become more supportive of democracy when it declines. Sara Wallace Goodman finds that citizens in the U.S. and Europe share strong notions of democratic citizenship but only people on some partisan sides respond to threats from polarization and foreign interference. Cross-national research on the scope and dynamics of public support for democracy can help us understand and connect our dilemmas at home and abroad.

Do Democrats and Republicans hate each other? Perhaps that only applies to a small proportion of Americans, but they get all the attention because they are the loudest, regularly posting on social media. Yanna Krupnikov and John Barry Ryan find that journalists overestimate polarization because they hear from the politically obsessed, who co-inhabit bubbles where politics is always central. For most Americans, partisanship is a relatively unimportant identity. What looks like dislike for the other party is actually disdain for politicians and people who are constantly talking about politics.

U.S. Democratic Decline in Comparative Perspective by Niskanen Center

Inflation is high, and President Biden's approval is low. News stories are focused on the rising prices at the pump, upsetting voters. But don't blame the media for the poor performance of the president's party. Laurel Harbridge-Yong finds that increasing gas prices hurt presidential approval, regardless of media coverage. Eric Merkley finds that media coverage of inflation—and the economy more generally—is more favorable for Democratic presidents than Republicans. The media is hyping short-term negative changes in inflation, but that is normal. And the results for Biden, like other presidents, will be negative. Photo: iStock https://www.istockphoto.com/photo/gas-gm517100356-89323611

Americans’ views on race are polarizing based on our partisan sides. But that does not mean our views on race are the factor driving our political decisions. Our political views may be changing our racial attitudes—and even our racial identities. Andrew Engelhardt finds that whites’ prior partisanship often predicts changes in their racial resentment and racial group feelings more than prior racial attitudes predict changes in partisanship. Alexander Agadjanian finds that some Americans changed their racial identities in alignment with their 2016 presidential vote, switching from Hispanic or mixed race to white when shifting to Trump. Race remains central to our politics, but the relationship is more complex than we may assume. Photo credit: iStock https://www.istockphoto.com/photo/protest-international-activist-movement-protesting-against-racism-and-fighting-for-gm1253299080-365972062

Democrats in Congress are working to pass federal support for universal pre-kindergarten and highly subsidized childcare without Republican support. But the policies will require bipartisan states to sign on in the first few years and a later federal government to extend the temporary policies. Will these initiatives be as polarizing as Obamacare or is this a popular policy destined to grow? Rachel VanSickle-Ward finds wide bipartisan public support for childcare policies and worker pay, despite elite polarization. Michael Little finds that Republican states took longer to adopt public pre-K, but that the vast majority eventually provided state funding. They both say to expect early partisanship but broad gains in early childhood education and the care economy. Photo: iStock

Many new mayors were just elected. Will they bring best practices in management or more attention to racial inequities ? Julia Payson finds that mayors’ public service motivation and managerial skills matter more than their backgrounds. Luisa Godinez Puig finds that mayors are divided by partisanship in how they think about racial inequality, but tend to articulate dialog-based solutions rather than structural reforms. They both say local politics are important for real problem solving, even though mayoral elections get less attention. Photo credit: iStock https://www.istockphoto.com/photo/city-hall-gm519863664-90746831

Democrats are deciding how to trim their reconciliation bill, considering expiring programs, means testing eligibility, and using tax credits rather than spending. To make these new social programs last after Democrats lose power, today's program design decisions are critical. Eric Patashnik finds that sustainable programs require incentivizing actors to see reforms through and not letting policy opponents re-organize to win at later stages. Stuart Kasdin finds that using the tax code and entitlements can increase program survivability, but that health and social welfare programs have a harder time surviving. They both say the policy battle isn’t over after a policy passes and its design matters to what lasts. Photo Credit: Joseph Chan via Unsplash: https://unsplash.com/photos/Q--730ajUcQ

Will Congress pass Biden’s $3.5 trillion reconciliation package? Is there hope for criminal justice or immigration reform, or will the Senate filibuster block the rest of Biden’s agenda? And can Biden play a role in uniting Democrats on a path forward, even as the impending legislation highlights deep divisions within the party? In this special conversational edition of the Science of Politics podcast, Matt Grossmann and Matt Glassman (Senior Fellow at the Government Affairs Institute at Georgetown University) discuss the status of the Biden agenda in Congress. They talk reconciliation, infrastructure, and spending, tying it into congressional procedure and how the agenda might progress or be derailed over the next few months as tensions between moderate and progressive Democrats come to a head and fiscal crises loom. Photo Credit: Samuel Schroth via Unsplash: https://unsplash.com/photos/gvauGFoXQ7c

How the Left and Right Undermined Trust in Government by Niskanen Center

How the Media Economy Drives Political News by Niskanen Center

Lawyers control the American court system, stock the administration, and even dominate our legislatures. They designed the institutions to ensure they’d continue to run the show. But today they face a political challenge because lawyers are far more liberal than elected officials or citizens. Conservative politicians are fighting back and making gains. Adam Bonica and Maya Sen find increasing polarization in the federal courts and strategic conflict between lawyers and conservative politicians in the states. But lawyers still pass legislation to benefit themselves and organize the judiciary to bar other entrants. It's no accident the U.S. stands out as a highly litigious society and legalistic state.

Fewer Americans are identifying as Christians and more have no religious affiliation. How will secular Americans transform politics? Ryan Burge tracks the decline in mainline protestants and the rise of Americans with no particular religious identity. He says they are part of a broader anti-institutional trend in American life, with only atheists and agnostics sticking out as the political subset. John C. Green finds a rise in avowed secularists who are motivated by politics and changing the face of the Democratic party. But these secularists don’t represent everyone who lacks a tie to organized religion.

For a special edition celebrating the 100th episode of the Science of Politics, Matt talks with Ezra Klein about how well political science informs American politics and public policy. They discuss how political science has changed in the age of Twitter and the era of Trump and the roles of scholars and journalists using research in debates on climate, COVID, and race.

Economic inequality is high and rising, but Americans aren’t clamoring for government action to address it. Nathan Kelly finds that rising economic inequality, rather than making the public favor redistribution, actually helps Republicans electorally and leads to policies that further entrench it and away from policies to combat it. Meghan Condon finds that Americans react to inequality by comparing themselves with those who have less, rather than to the rich, imaging themselves better off than others who they think don’t work as hard. They both say rising inequality does not make it easier to address through political action.

Do Democrats and Republicans now hate the other side with no way to breakthrough? Or can we tone down our social divides with shared values? Jon Kingzette finds that negative perceptions of the other party are driven mostly by ideological differences and are targeted at the politicians in the party rather than ordinary citizens. We may not be so tribal after all. Jan Voelkel finds that liberal candidates can earn support by framing their policies with conservative values. We can gain support by signaling that we have more in common than it appears.

Congressional action now seems to be mostly about building partisan floor majorities, with committees doing more grandstanding and less legislating. But there is still a lot of action in committees, especially in distributing goods to states and districts. Jonathan Lewallen finds that congressional committees are holding fewer legislative hearings over time, due to centralized lawmaking powers. But Leah Rosenstiel finds that committee members still change policy to benefit their states. They both say committees and constituencies still matter, even in our hyperpartisan age.

Most of the politics voters see are national and presidential. Local television news can help Americans learn about state and local politics, but it is threatened by nationalization. Daniel Moskowitz finds that local TV news helps citizens learn more about their governors and senators, encouraging split-ticket voting. But Joshua McCrain finds that Sinclair broadcasting group has bought up local stations, increasing coverage of national politics and moving rightward. Local news coverage is in decline but offers one of the major remaining bulwarks against nationalization and polarization.

Is Demographic and Geographic Polarization Overstated? by Niskanen Center

Americans love to hate Congress and legislators often seem to ignore public views. But it turns out constituents do judge their representatives on the policies they develop and pass. Carlos Algara finds that public approval of congress is responsive to the ideological views of the majority party, making it risky to stray too far from voters. And legislators in both parties react to voter opinions, but in distinct ways. Adam Cayton finds that Republican voters judge their legislators more on their symbolic ideology whereas Democrats judge their members based on issue positions. Legislators in each party behave accordingly, responding to their constituents' ideologies or policy views.

Supporters of the QAnon conspiracy theory were implicated in the January 6th storming of the Capitol. Former supporters have even been elected to Congress. Is conspiracy thinking on the rise? Has it taken over the Republican Party? Joseph Uscinski finds little evidence that conspiracy theory beliefs are rising due to Trump or the pandemic. Instead, Trump mobilized the long conspiracy-minded. Adam Enders finds that we are prone to noticing conspiracy theories on the political right, but conspiracy beliefs do not align with the political right or left. They are part of a separate anti-institutional dimension of public opinion. New conspiracies echo those of the past, drawing the same types of Americans.

Democrats have full control of government but the Senate filibuster is blocking large agenda items. How likely is reform and what would it look like? What does the filibuster's resilience say about the role of partisanship in policymaking? Sarah Binder of George Washington University and the Brookings Institution has long been tracking the filibuster and attempts at reform. She sets the record straight on a special conversational edition.

Biden is abruptly shifting immigration and refugee policies from Trump, facing new blowback. Are public views rooted in anti-Latino racism or a broader American ethos? Mark Ramirez finds that anti-Latino attitudes are pervasive because Latinos are stereotyped as not living up to American values; these attitudes predict policy opinions and helped elect Donald Trump. But Matthew Wright finds Americans’ mixed immigration attitudes are built on norms of assimilation and the rule of law. Providing counter-stereotypical information can reduce prejudices’ role in opinions. They both say anti-immigration opinions combine prejudices and values because immigrants are stereotyped as inconsistent with assimilation and legality.

Advocates and legislators often want to generate media attention for their preferred legislation, but that does not help pass bills in Congress. Mary Layton Atkinson finds that media coverage focuses on legislation with partisan conflict and emphasizes process over policy substance. That tells voters that Congress is dysfunctional and full of extremists, reducing support for policy change. John Lovett finds that media coverage leads to more intervention by backbencher legislators, creating a spiral of increasing salience that makes it harder for leadership to pass bills. Congressional media coverage turns off the public with stories of conflict-ridden sausage making that disrupt internal consensus-building.

How Political Values and Social Influence Drive Polarization by Niskanen Center

Some Republican voters supported the January 6th storming of the capitol, raising fears that the U.S. will continue to escalate violent extremism, moving everyday partisans toward endorsement of violence against their political opponents. Nathan Kalmoe and Lilliana Mason find that partisanship leads a sizeable minority of Americans to support violence or wish harm on the other party’s leaders and followers, especially after they lose elections. Drawing on survey experiments and history back to the American Civil War, they show the importance of messages in moving us over the brink or back from it.

Violent right-wing extremism again came to America's attention in the Capitol insurrection, including organized militia groups and white supremacists. How did these movements build support, radicalize, and evolve out of the alt-right? Sam Jackson tracks the growth of the militia movement and its involvement in right-wing politics, helping to explain the involvement of former military and law enforcement in the Capitol riot. George Hawley finds that online white nationalists were effectively hobbled by law enforcement after Charlottesville, but that their imagery and tactics live on in some of the right-wing extremism that followed. They both see the capitol insurrection as an amalgam of right-wing supporters with different motives.

The Politics of School from Home by Niskanen Center